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INTRODUCTION
This comment compares the civil justice systems of the United States
and the Soviet Union. The civil justice systems of both societies share
common objectives;1 each seeks to provide quality civil justice in accor-
dance with its social and economic values.2 Quality civil justice in-
cludes speedy dispute resolution with minimal cost to society, high sat-
isfaction for disputants, and preservation of social values.3 Moreover,
quality civil justice requires ready access to civil dispute resolution
1. See National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Ad-
ministration of Justice, 70 F.R.D. 79 (1976) (conference proceedings) (discussing the
reasons for dissatisfaction with the United States justice system and possible goals for a
reformed system); Johnson, Access to Justice in the United States: the Economic Bar-
riers and Some Promising Solutions, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE: A WORLD SURVEY 915
(M. Cappelletti & B. Garth ed. 1978) (studying the reasons for failure of the United
States justice system to provide ready access to dispute resolution and discussing the
goals for a reformed system); Zivs & Melnikov, The Legal Status of Parties in Soviet
Civil Procedure: Rights, Duties and Guarantees, in FUNDAMENTAL GUARANTEES OF
THE PARTIES IN CIVIL LITIGATION 639 (M. Cappelletti & D. Tallon ed. 1973) [herein-
after cited as Zivs & Melnikov] (presenting a study of "rights" of parties in the Soviet
civil justice system and discussing the goals of civil justice); Puchinskiy, Access to Jus-
tice in the Soviet Union, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE: A WORLD SURVEY 819 (M. Cappel-
letti & B. Garth ed. 1978) (presenting an overview of citizen access to the Soviet civil
justice system and discussing the goals of the Soviet system).
2. See L. NADER & H. TODD, THE DISPUTING PROCESS-LAw IN TEN SOCIEIES 2
(1978) [hereinafter cited as L. NADER & H. TODD] (presenting a study which dis-
cusses in its survey of dispute resolution mechanisms in different societies the role of
the preservation of social order in the civil dispute resolution process).
3. See Address by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger before the Twin Cities Advisory
Council of the American Arbitration Association, Saint Paul, Minnesota (Aug. 21,
1985) [hereinafter cited as Burger Address] (available at the United States Supreme
Court information center, Washington, D.C.) (discussing the quality of justice in the
United States and goals of civil justice); Friedman, Access to Justice: Social and His-
torical Context, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE: PROMISING INSTITUTIONS 5 (M. Cappelletti &
J. Weisner ed. 1978) (discussing the consideration in analyzing access to justice).
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mechanisms for all citizens." A comparison of whether United States
and Soviet civil justice systems provide quality civil justice and, more
specifically, ready access to civil justice for their citizens, will hopefully
suggest ways to improve the American system.
Part I of this comment analyzes the United States civil justice
model: a system which emphasizes the use of the judicial forum.' Part I
also examines the trend toward the creation of non-judicial dispute res-
olution forums that has developed in response to maladministration of
civil justice and overuse of the United States judicial structure.0 Part II
analyzes the civil justice system of the Soviet Union, a system that of-
fers an abundance of well-established quasi-judicial and non-judicial
forums that complement the courts and provide vehicles for the resolu-
tion of civil disputes. A comparison of the two systems then reveals that
the Soviet system avoids many of the present shortcomings of the
United States system.7 Finally, this comment analyzes what the United
States can learn from the Soviet model. The distinct social values of
the Soviet Union that permit the implementation of a variety of dispute
resolution techniques potentially unacceptable in the United States
temper recommendations for change based solely on the Soviet experi-
ence. Nevertheless, a comparative analysis illuminates many of the
causes for drawbacks in the United States system, and it prompts sug-
gestions for future growth.
4. See Johnson, Thinking About Access: A Preliminary Typology of Possible
Strategies, in PERSPECTIVES ON AccESS TO JUSTICE (M. Cappelletti & B. Garth ed.
1979) (presenting a comprehensive sociological study of the considerations to be made
in the construction of a civil justice system with a ready access to dispute resolution).
5. This article applies certain terms in a special context. The term "judicial organ"
refers to a court within the meaning of article III of the U.S. Constitution. The term
"quasi-judicial organ" refers to a forum that though administered entirely by the State
is not a court within the meaning of article III. A "non-judicial organ" is any dispute
resolution vehicle that the State may or may not administer and that does not produce
decisions that the State may inherently enforce.
6. See J. MARKS, E. JOHNSON & P. SZANTON, DIsPUTE RESOLUTION IN AMERICA:
PROCESS IN EVOLUTION (1984) [hereinafter cited as DIsPUTE RESOLUTION] (presenting
an overview of the present crisis in the administration of civil justice in the United
States and the objectives of the alternative dispute resolution movement); I OHIO ST. J.
ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1985) (containing a number of articles on the alternative
dispute resolution movement).
7. See Chechot, Judicial Protection of Subjective Rights and Interests, SOVErSKOE
GOSUDARSTVO PRAVO 4 (1967), cited in J. HAZARD, W. BUTLER & P. MAGGS, THE
SovIET LEGAL SYSTEM: THE LAW IN THE 1980's 126 (1984) [hereinafter cited as So-
viET LEGAL SYSTEM] (presenting an overview of various types of dispute resolution
forums in the Soviet society).
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I. ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES
Our system is too costly, too painful, too destructive, too inefficient, for a truly
civilized people.8
-Chief Justice Warren E. Burger
A. GUARANTEES TO ACCESS: THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AND STATUTORY PROTECTION
The United States Constitution only implicitly guarantees access to
civil justice by providing for the creation of a Supreme Court and such
inferior courts as Congress may establish.9 The Constitution delegates
judicial power to hear and rule on a wide variety of cases to those
courts.10 Article III of the federal Constitution further enumerates spe-
cific cases over which courts have jurisdiction and, in some cases, the
nature of that jurisdiction. Complex state and federal civil codes sup-
plement the Constitution.11 Together, they define the relationships be-
tween individuals and organizations, and the reciprocal obligations aris-
ing from those relationships.' 2 The common law also provides a large
8. Burger, The State of Justice, 70 A.B.A.J. 62, 66 (1984).
9. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § I (providing in the pertinent part that "[tihe judicial
power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior
courts as the Congress shall from time to time ordain and establish"); Smit, Constitu-
tional Guarantees in Civil Litigation in the United States of America, in FUNDAMEN-
TAL GUARANTEES OF THE PARTIES IN CIVIL LITIGATION 417, 421 (M. Cappelletti & D.
Tallon ed. 1973) (noting that explicit constitutional guarantees to access to the courts
do not exist in the United States). Nevertheless, the common law regards access to the
courts as a necessary prerequisite for the pursuit of justice which courts have charac-
terized as a fundamental right under the Constitution's Due Process guarantee. See,
e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (ruling that access to the courts is a
fundamental constitutional right).
10. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Trea-
ties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority").
11. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, requiring that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of the law", have been the principal Constitutional provisions in.
terpreted under the common law as guaranteeing citizen access to the courts. U.S.
CONST. amend. V. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977); Dreher v.
Sielaff, 636 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1980); Mitchum v. Purvis, 650 F.2d 647 (5th Cir.
1981) (ruling that the Due Process Clauses of the Constitution guarantee the right of
access to the courts); see also Smit, Constitutional Guarantees in Civil Litigation in
the United States of America, in FUNDAMENTAL GUARANTEES OF THE PARTIES IN
CIVIL LITIGATION 417, 449 (M. Cappelletti & D. Tallon ed. 1971) (presenting a gen-
eral overview of citizen access to the courts under the United States Constitution).
12. See Act to Establish Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. XX, 1 Stat. 73
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (1789) (defining the Supreme
Court's function and establishing inferior federal courts). See generally D. BRODY,
THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: CONCEPTS & PRINCIPLES 21 (1978) (presenting a his-
torical overview of the development of federal district and circuit courts); Stoffel v.
W.J. McCahan Sugar Ref. & Molasses Co., 35 F.2d 602, 603 (D.C. Pa. 1929) (dis-
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body of precedent that further defines the rights and obligations of
individuals.13
The civil courts provide a forum for resolution of the wide variety of
disputes that arise under these laws. The breadth of the courts' juris-
diction to entertain civil disputes, however, does not guarantee access to
justice. Statutes and the common law have restricted access to the
courts for civil disputes.1 4 Potential litigants, generally, must exhaust
other civil dispute resolution mechanisms or fulfill statutory require-
ments before resorting to the courts.1 5 A specific court, further, must
have proper jurisdiction over the dispute.1 6 Also, the court must con-
sider the case "ripe" for adjudication."7 Access to the courts for resolu-
tion of civil disputes, moreover, is not guaranteed, particularly where
alternative dispute resolution forums might exist. 18 Despite these gen-
cussing "law" as being defined according to these terms).
13. Moore v. United States, 91 U.S. (7 Wall.) 270 (1875) (noting that the common
law is the basis for American legal doctrine). The United States common law system
recognizes both codified laws and case precedent as existing "law." Early American
colonies inherited the common law system from the British. See Delaware Optometric
Corp. v. Sherwood, 86 Del. 222, 225, 128 A.2d 812, 816 (Del. 1957) (discussing Dela-
ware's inheritance of the common law system). Subsequently, states that had not becn
British colonies adopted the common law system. See, e.g., South Pac. Co. v. Porter,
160 Tex. 329, 331, 331 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Tex. 1960) (discussing Texas' adoption of the
common law system). See generally R. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 176
(1921); B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 34 (1970) (discussing
the evolution of the common law).
14. See, e.g., Ex Parte McCardle 74 U.S. 506 (1869) (supporting the broad powers
of Congress to limit the jurisdiction of the courts), upheld in Lauf v. E.G. Shinner &
Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938); see also Norris La Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15, 107
(1982) (limiting Federal jurisdiction to issue an injunction on behalf of a business in-
volved in a labor dispute).
15. See, e.g., In re NLRB, 304 U.S. 486 (1938) (discussing statutory requirements
imposed upon complainants as prerequisites to the court's entertaining judicial review
of NLRB orders).
16. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1631 (1982) (establishing the statutory jurisdiction of
the federal courts); see also American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951)
(holding that even at the appellate level, a suit already tried may be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction); Wells Fargo & Co. v. City of San Francisco, 144 P.2d 415, 417 (Cal.
1944) (presenting a general discussion on jurisdictional authority of courts to hear a
dispute).
17. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 277, 239 (1937) (discussing the
article III, section 2 "Case or Controversy" requirement of the U.S. Constitution); see
also Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or Contro-
versy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979) (discussing the "Case or Contro-
versy" requirement); Tuschnet, The Sociology of Article 111: A Response to Professor
Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1698 (1980) (same); Brilmayer, A Reply, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1727 (1980) (same).
18. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). In Boddie the Supreme Court
stated:
[t]his Court has seldom been asked to view access to the courts as an element of
due process . . . . "The" legitimacy of the State's monopoly over the techniques
of final dispute settlement, even where some are denied access to its use. stands
19861
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
eral limitations, however, wide access to the courts remains. The ab-
sence of precise limitations for recourse to courts in the majority of
civil disputes has created a popular feeling that anything can be
litigated.
B. THE JUDICIAL FORUM
1. The Role of the Courts
The federal Constitution grants the courts broad judicial powers to
adjudicate civil disputes. A judge, panel of judges or, where provided
for, a jury, hear and rule upon civil disputes. 19 The state and federal
governments have three principal levels of courts: courts of original ju-
risdiction, and two appellate.levels. 20 In the states, there is a trial court
level, sometimes an intermediate appellate level, and a state supreme
court. 21 In the federal system, there are district courts of original juris-
diction within each state (ninety-four in the nation), appellate circuit
courts (thirteen in the nation), and the United States Supreme Court
named in the Constitution.22 Civil and criminal matters are heard in
separate courts.23 Potential litigants may file civil disputes at either the
state trial level or at the federal district court level, depending on the
nature of the controversy and the court's jurisdiction.24 Certain appel-
unimpaired where recognized, effective alternatives for the adjustment of differ-
ences remain.
We do not decide that access for all individuals to the court is a right that is,
in all circumstances, guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment so that its exercise may not be placed beyond the reach of any
individual.
Id.
See also Comment, The Heirs of Boddie: Court Access for Indigents after Kras and
Ortwein, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 571 (1973) (discussing the effect of Boddie on
court access for indigents).
19. See U.S. CONST. AMEND. VII (providing the right to trial by jury where the
value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars); Ex PARTE Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)
(discussing the seventh amendment right to trial by jury and limitations on that right).
20. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1631 (1982) (providing for the organization of the fed-
eral court system); MD. CoNST. art. IV (regarding the creation and organization of the
Md. state court system); see also H. GRILLIOT, INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND THE LE-
GAL SYSTEM 46-137 (2d ed. 1983) (presenting an overview of the U.S. state and fed-
eral court system).
21. State court systems differ. See, e.g., MD. CONsT. art. IV (regarding the crea-
tion and organization of the Maryland state court system).
22. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1631 (1982) (providing for the organization of the Fed-
eral court system).
23. See, e.g., State v. Nast, 209 Mo. 708, 108 S.W. 563 (1908) (discussing statu-
tory sources of judicial authority and the distinctions between the jurisdiction over civil
and criminal disputes).
24. See supra notes 14-16 (presenting an overview of jurisdiction).
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late courts have original jurisdiction over specific claims.20 Most civil
litigants have an automatic right to appeal adverse judgments to higher
levels and litigants may also appeal some matters from the state su-
preme court up to the federal level.26 Additionally, numerous special-
ized courts having original jurisdiction over specific matters have devel-
oped in both the state and federal systems. 27
2. The Interrelationship of Law, Justice, and the Courts
In the United States, the importance of the judiciary for interpreting
and administering the law has been inextricably linked to the preserva-
tion of the higher ideals of justice.28 During the 18th and 19th centu-
ries, the populace perceived the law as an immutable body of funda-
mental rights and freedoms that would preserve certain inherent rights
of citizens enumerated in the Constitution, as well as stabilize the gov-
ernmental order against transient changes in popular political philoso-
phy.29 With the populace conceiving the law as an expression of higher
values, the image of the U.S. judiciary became elevated above that of
the ordinary citizen.30 Similarly, commentators have criticized the
members of the professionalized bar for characterizing themselves as
"priests at the temple of justice,"' 31 much as religious figures character-
ize themselves as guardians of higher moral principles.
25. See U.S. CONST. art. III, section 2 and 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982) (establishing
original jurisdiction of United States Supreme Court).
26. See Stiles v. American Trust Co., 137 Cal. 2d 472, 290 P.2d 614 (1955); John-
son v. Board of Zoning and Appeals of Baltimore County, 196 Md. 400, 76 A.2d 736(1950) (discussing generally the statutory nature of the right to appeal).
27. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 151-159 (creating courts specifically designated to adjudicate
bankruptcy matters); 28 U.S.C. §§ 251-257 (1982), as amended 28 U.S.C. § 252
(Supp. III 1984); see also W. BURGER, YEAR END REPORT OF THE JUDICIARY (1982)
(available at the United States Supreme Court Information Center, Washington, D.C.)
(critiquing the effectiveness of specialized courts).
28. See E. Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE PoLTncs
OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 18 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) (presenting a historical
overview of the link between the judiciary and law and its perceived influence upon
justice).
29. See C. CORWIN, CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION 79-139 (R. Loss ed. 1981)
(discussing the background of constitutional law in the United States); Mensch, supra
note 28, at 19-23 (noting that in the pre-classical period law was routinely described as
reflecting a universal divine justice. "IT]he single most popular legal quotation, for
rhetorical purposes, was taken from the Anglican theologian Hooker: 'Of law no less
can be acknowledged, than that her seat is the bosom of God; her voice armony of the
world'").
30. Mensch, supra note 28. See also J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE (1976) (crit-
icizing the U.S. legal profession and American Bar Association for elevating them-
selves above the "average" U.S. citizen).
31. Mensch, supra note 28, at 19.
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The nature of the common law itself, however, is responsible for ele-
vating lawyers above their clients. Because courts based their decisions
on often complex manipulations of precedent, litigants were forced to
rely on well-educated attorneys in order to prevail.32 As a result, access
to civil justice gradually became dependent upon the employment of
professional practitioners.83 Development of professional organizations
for attorneys exacerbated this trend, further separating the guardians
of the law from their clients.3'
American legal thinking during the 20th century, in keeping with the
dramatic changes in the social order, has taken on greater flexibility in
the interpretation of fundamental legal rights and in the formation of
policies that have helped to adapt the law to the needs of modern and
dynamic society.3 5 This adaptability has further contributed to the in-
creased power of the judiciary and professional bar not only as leaders
in the area of the law, but in society as a whole. 36 Laymen believe that
courts are capable of applying magical legal reasoning to create a just
remedy for all civil wrongs.37 Moreover, with the developing role of the
32. See id. at 21, n.8 (citing the famous statement by Lord Coke, that although
"judges (including, especially, the King) had excellent natural reason, they did not
have the 'artificial reason' of the law, which 'is an art which requires long study and
experience, before that a man can attain the cognizance of it.'" 12 Coke's Rep. 63, 65,
77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1343 (K.B. 1608). Mensch, commenting on the technicality of law
during the pre-classical period, asserts that Coke's theory survived. Id. Such technical-
ity, of course, makes it necessary to hire the expert "artificial reason" that only a
trained professional attorney could provide. Id.; see also J. AUERBACH, supra note 30,
at 74-101 (discussing the rigor of legal education in the early 1900's and the conse-
quent metamorphosis of legal doctrine into a technical morass which only lawyers
could comprehend)..
33. See infra note 36 (discussing perceptions of the role of "lawmakers" in differ-
ent legal systems).
34. Mensch, supra note 28, at 19.
35. See M. Horowitz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860
(1977) at 253-66 (discussing the emerging importance of policy in legal decision-mak-
ing and the consequent increased role of lawyers as policy-makers in the U.S. society);
see also Mensch, supra note 28, at 29-37 (discussing the realist and post-realist periods
in which judges openly considered policy and social needs in making decisions); J.
AUERBACH, supra note 30, at 228-30 (discussing the increased and growing importance
of lawyers in all aspects of politics and policy-making, a role traditionally filled by
politicians).
36. See Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of our Courts? in National Conference
on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 70 F.R.D.
79, 98 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Rifkind] (describing the role of the American judge
as "lawmaker, a commentator, and an innovator to an extent not known in the coun-
tries which lack a legal system having roots in the common law").
37. See L. NADER & H. TODD, supra note 2, at 3 (discussing citizen's use of the
law as a vehicle for personal protection as well as to enact social change); see also
Rosenberg, Devising Procedures that are Civil to Promote Justice that is Civilized, 69
MICH. L. REv. 797, 811 (1971) (noting that courts have been "the most responsive and
the most effective agencies of change during the past generation. As a result, highly
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courts in the declaration and affirmation of the law in modern society,
access to the courts has logically become an essential element for the
achievement of civil justice. The judiciary's role in modern society as
an institution of social authority is exemplified by the courts' interven-
tion in numerous areas where regulation by other organs of government
might appear more appropriate.3 8 As in the 19th century, the judiciary
has thus remained an institution which stands separately from the
other government organs for the interpretation of the law, and, particu-
larly in the 20th century, the implementation of civil justice.
C. THE QUASI-JUDICIAL FORUM: THE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
Despite its status as the primary forum for civil disputes, the govern-
ment-supported judicial system represents only one of many such fo-
rums. Consideration of large caseloads dictate that other governmental
bodies be given quasi-judicial functions. 39 The government's provision
for alternative forums of dispute resolution to judicial bodies represents
not only a practical necessity, but also an important trend in this
direction.40
As a complement to the judiciary, the federal government created
many specialized quasi-judicial administrative tribunals within federal
charged political and social issues, among many others, increasingly have been brought
to the courts, not as a last resort, but as a first resort. The common attitude is that
courts can do anything. . ."); DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 6, at 16 ("America's
court system stands as the fundamental dispute processing and resolution institution in
our society, providing both a primary and an ultimate forum"); K. LIEBERMAN, THE
LITGIOUS SOCIETY (1981) (extensive study of the growth of the use of courts and
litigiousness as a social phenomena).
38. See Rifkind, supra note 36 ("The American public today perceives courts as
jack-of-all-trades, available to furnish the answer to whatever may trouble us: Shall we
build nuclear power plants, and if so, where? Shall the Concorde fly to our shores?
How do we tailor dismissal and lay-off programs during the depression, without undo-
ing all of the progress achieved during prosperity by anti-discrimination statutes? All
these are now the continuous grist of the judicial mills."). See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344
F. Supp. 373, 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), enforcing 325 F. Supp. 781 (D. Ala. 1971), affd
in part, remanded in part, decision reversed in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503
F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (placing the Alabama state mental health system under the
federal court's supervision).
39. See Levi, The Business of Courts: A Summary and a Sense of Perspective in
National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administra-
tion of Justice, 70 F.R.D. 79, 222 (1976) (discussing the need for the judiciary to
break away from their traditional role as the only social dispute resolvers, and further,
the need for other institutions to take on that role).
40. See Cappelletti, Fundamental Guarantees of the Parties in Civil Proceedings,
in FUNDAMENTAL GUARANTEES OF THE PARTIES IN CIVIL LITIGATION 661, 706 (M.
Cappelletti & D. Tallon ed. 1973) (discussing the increased governmental social re-
sponsibility in the 20th century that has correspondingly increased the obligation and
intervention of courts).
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agencies. 4 These tribunals enforce federal laws, promulgate regula-
tions, and offer forums for dispute resolution on questions related to
agency expertise.42 A variety of such administrative forums exist, each
having the distinct characteristics. granted to them by statute.4 3 Proce-
dures for adjudication and rules of evidence vary with each administra-
tive tribunal." Generally, they are much less formal than a court judi-
cial proceeding. 45 To this end, the federal government created
administrative forums for the resolution of labor disputes related to em-
ployee claims of discrimination in the civil service. The Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has an office in each of the
federal agencies which investigates claims of employment discrimina-
tion and attempts to resolve disputes between complainants and their
employers on an informal, and later formal, basis.46 Further, dissatis-
fied complainants must appeal to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission 47 before a claim can be brought to a court.48 Federal
41. See generally G. ELDES & J. NELSON, FEDERAL REGULATORY PROCESS
AGENCY PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES (1985) (discussing the different federal agen-
cies, and their principal administrative and adjudicative authority).
42. Id.; see also K. WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL
SYSTEM 270-309 (1982) (discussing agency functions in a chapter on Order-Making:
Agencies as Judicial Bodies).
43. One example of such an administrative agency is the National Labor Relations
Board, created by the National Labor Relations Act (codified as amended 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-169 (1982)). The Board consists of five administrative judges who rule on
claims of unfair labor practices and collective bargaining representation claims falling
under the National Labor Relations Act. The Board also has a staff that performs
other investigatory and enforcement functions related to federal labor laws. Id.; see G.
ELDES & J. NELSON, supra note 41 (presenting a comprehensive overview of the differ-
ent federal agencies).
44. See The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. 554, 556-557
(1982 & Supp. 11 1984) (setting general standards for administrative hearings). The
Act provides for varying procedures and degrees of formality suggesting that adminis-
trative tribunals might be considered more adaptable forums than courts; see also infra
notes 75-91 and accompanying text (discussing the inappropriateness of the judicial
forum for the resolution of a variety of disputes); K. WARREN, supra note 42, at 286
(observing the trend in judicial opinions toward requiring greater formality in adminis-
trative hearings). In addition to statutory procedural requirements, the courts have im-
posed increasing formalities on administrative proceedings. Administrative forums now
closely resemble judicial forums. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (outlin-
ing minimum due process standards for administrative hearings).
45. See infra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing different dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms).
46. See 29 C.F.R. § 1613 (1985) (containing the federal regulations which govern
the administration of employee complaints).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1982) (establishing the EEOC).
48. See id. at §§ 1613.281-1613.283 (referring to the court appeal of EEOC rul-
ings). Such quasi-judicial dispute resolution mechanisms in the workplace have been
replicated by non-judicial dispute resolution mechanisms in the private sector, particu-
larly in organizations run by larger employers who have negotiated employment con-
tracts through collective bargaining. See F. FOULKES, PERSONNEL POLICIES IN LARGE
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tribunals such as these offer a quasi-judicial forum of original jurisdic-
tion on various legal questions within their competence.40 Often a court
cannot review these questions without a complainant first exhausting
the dispute resolution alternatives that agencies offer.50 Nevertheless,
provision of judicial review of many agency determinations demon-
strates that the courts have ultimate superiority as mechanisms for de-
termining justice in the United States system.5"
D. THE SUCCESS OF THE JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL FORUM
1. An Overview
Liberal constitutional guarantees, extensive legislative and expansive
common law rights are meaningless to parties lacking access to these
dispute resolution forums, i.e., access to civil justice. 2 The United
States justice system has entered into a state of crisis in the last cen-
tury,53 and in the next decade necessarily faces great development."
NON-UNION COMPANIES (1980) (presenting an overview of such in-house dispute reso-
lution mechanisms). Many employers have established optional and mandatory (to the
extent that employees must use the in-house procedures for dispute resolution before
being able to bring a claim to a court) procedures. Id. Other employers have complex
dispute resolution mechanisms consisting of an Ombudsperson who works indepen-
dently of the employer's management and investigates with an intent to resolve infor-
mally, a variety of claims, and a grievance committee with appeals to arbitration. Id.;
see also ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION.
ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 49-50
(select bibliography of works dealing with alternative dispute resolution in the area of
employment).
49. See K. WARREN, supra note 42, at 385 (discussing the "primary jurisdiction
doctrine" that "acknowledges that public agencies should normally be permitted to set-
tle disputes affecting their agencies first unless: (1) the agency has ruled previously on
a similar question; (2) the regulation or issue in the dispute is patently unreasonable; or
(3) the issue poses a question which is clearly within the jurisdiction and competence of
the judiciary"); see also Texas and Pac. R.R. Co. v. Abilene, 204 U.S. 426 (1907)
(illustrating the judicial application of this doctrine by deferring to the original juris-
diction of the Interstate Commerce Commission in a dispute over railroad rates).
50. See supra note 48 (describing different dispute resolution mechanisms).
51. See K. WARREN, supra note 42, at 288-89 (criticizing the myth that the judici-
ary is an inherently superior forum for the resolution of disputes); D. ROSENBLOOM,
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND LAW 33-60 (1983) (discussing the tension between the
administrative agencies and the federal courts on matters of judicial review of adminis-
trative decisions).
52. See L. NADER & H. TODD, supra note 2, at 34 ("Rights without access to
forums are no rights at all") (emphasis added).
53. See National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice, 70 F.R.D. 79, 107 (1976) (conference proceedings); W.
BURGER, supra note 27 (discussing the sources of the crisis in the U.S. justice system);
see also Rosenberg, Devising Procedures that are Civil to Promote Civil Justice that is
Civilized, 69 MICH. L. REv. 797 (1971) (recognizing the crisis and the need for reform
in the civil justice system).
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Denial of access to civil justice stems from high costs associated with
pursuing claims, long delays in processing claims, and the alienation of
litigants due to the inappropriateness of the traditional adversary mod-
els for the resolution of many types of civil disputes. Dissatisfaction and
disillusion with this lack of access has led to numerous attempts at re-
form.5 5 The 1970's and the 1980's have witnessed a tension between
those advocating structural reform of the courts, and those seeking
more alternative quasi-judicial and non-judicial forums for civil dispute
resolution.56
2. The Cost
A recurring criticism of the United States court system is that only
the wealthy have access to justice.57 Although court costs are involved
in filing most civil actions, they are usually set at low rates with the
objective that they cover only administrative fees.58 The high costs for
individuals in civil actions are primarily attributable to attorneys'
fees. 59 Complexities in court procedures, in rules of evidence, and in the
interpretation of laws and judicial precedent, make the assistance of a
lawyer essential to the pursuit of civil claims.60 The high costs of attor-
ney representation, however, often denies the poor effective representa-
tion; a potential litigant who cannot afford a lawyer cannot afford ac-
54. See DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 6 (presenting a comprehensive overview
of the problems of the traditional court system and the nature of present study and
attempts at reform within the U.S. legal community).
55. Interview with Larry Ray, Director of the American Bar Association Special
Committee on Dispute Resolution, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 19, 1985).
56. Id.
57. See Jolowicz, Fundamental Guarantees in Civil Litigation: England, in FUN-
DAMENTAL GUARANTEES OF THE PARTIES IN CIVIL LITIGATION 121, 153 (M. Cappel-
letti & D. Tallon eds. 1973) ("Justice is open to all, like the Ritz Hotel"); see also R.
SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 8 (1919), cited in Carlin & Howard, Legal Represen-
tation and Class Justice, 12 UCLA L. REV. 381 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Carlin &
Howard]. ("The administration of American justice is not impartial, the rich and the
poor do not stand on an equality before the law, the traditional method of providing
justice has operated to close the doors of the courts to the poor, and has caused a gross
denial of justice in all parts of the country to millions of persons.").
58. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 919-20 (reproducing court costs in litigation).
Although court costs may be low, some argue they still deny justice to indigents. See
Comment, The Heirs of Boddie: Court Access for Indigents After Kras and Ortwien 8
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 571 (1973) (exploring fifth and fourteenth amendment ap-
proaches to challenging required court costs for indigents in light of Boddie and subse-
quent case law).
59. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 921 (arguing the primary source of civil litigation
costs is attorneys' fees); Carlin & Howard, supra note 57 (discussing the legal
problems of the poor and the high cost of attorneys).
60. Carlin & Howard, supra note 57, at 381 (discussing the essential role of attor-
neys, their high cost, and the subsequent denial of justice to the poor).
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cess to justice.61 Even for an individual who can spare enough money to
hire an attorney, opportunity costs may exceed the amount in contro-
versy.62 Finally, where free legal aid through a public service organiza-
tion is available, the poor often receive second-class legal representation
in comparison to individuals able to hire private attorneys.03
The pursuit of a claim before an administrative tribunal entails the
same high costs attributable to the courts. 4 Costly legal assistance is
essential even in a claim's early pre-hearing stages. 5 As in the courts,
statutes, complex regulations, and precedent define the parties' rights.68
Thus, even in quasi-judicial forums, success depends upon hiring pro-
fessional counsel. Parties seeking administrative remedies through
quasi-judicial forums, moreover, need to protect their rights at every
stage of the proceedings in the event they need to appeal the adminis-
trative decision. 67
3. The Delay
A civil action, from filing to enforcement of judgment, may stretch
over several months or years.68 Reasons for court delay include the
61. See Pipkin, Legal and Elitism in the American Legal Profession, in R. S.tT,
JUSTICE AND THE POOR xi (1972) ("The inability of poor persons to enforce the rights
afforded them by law have [sic] promoted their own exploitation: it having perverted
the American Dream").
62. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 923 (discussing opportunity costs as a deterrent
to bringing suits).
63. See Carlin & Howard, supra note 57, at 384 (1965) (discussing the allegation
that individuals in the economic lower-class are "stuck" with second-rate services); see
also B. Christensen, Delivery of Legal Services to Persons of Low and Modest Income:
In the Shade of the Old Atrophy, in QUEST FOR JUSTICE 1973 A.B.A. CO.NI'N NAT'L
INST. JUST. 100 (depicting justice for the rich as an Olympian and justice for low and
moderate income people as a dwarf).
64. See K. WARREN, supra note 42, at 300-301 (discussing the constitutional right
to counsel and the problem of counsel's expense for litigants before the administrative
proceedings).
65. Courts have acknowledged the right to and importance of counsel before ad-
ministrative hearings. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) (noting that "the
right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the
right to be heard by counsel"). Though courts have recognized a right to counsel, they
have not recognized a corresponding duty on behalf of the government to appoint free
counsel for indigents. K. WARREN supra note 42, at 300. But see Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 555 (as amended by 5 U.S.C. § 555 (1984 & Supp. 11 1976))
(establishing statutory right to counsel in a compelled federal agency hearing).
66. See generally S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULA-
TORY POLICY 1 (1979) (discussing the law-making process in administrative agencies).
67. See K. WARREN, supra note 42, at 373-402 (discussing the nature of judicial
review of administrative actions).
68. Higginbotham, The Priority of Human Rights in Court Reform, in National
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 70 F.R.D. 79, 152-53 (1976) (discussing the potential for long delays in
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complexity of actions69 and abuse of complex procedures.70 Most signif-
icant, however, is case overload."1 Courts and commentators have ad-
vanced numerous reasons for this problem, including the use of the
courts to resolve all types of disputes whether appropriate or not for the
court mechanism, 72 the litigious pre-disposition of American society,7 8
and the growth of the urban population with its attendant increased
likelihood of civil conflict.74
Large caseloads also overextend administrative agencies. The Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, for example, has over 900 unfair labor
practice cases and almost 300 representation cases pending on its dock-
ets.75 The median time for the processing of a single claim is five
months.76 Delayed justice, however, frequently leads to denied justice.
4. The Inappropriateness of the Judicial Forum
Commentators also criticize the courts for not always providing an
appropriate forum for the resolution of many types of disputes. 77 At
litigation).
69. In United States v. IBM, No. 69 Civ. 200 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1977), the gov-
ernment has planned to bring forward one hundred witnesses and IBM has planned to
bring forward four hundred. After the first nine months of the trial, only twenty five
government witnesses had yet been called.
70. Rifkind, supra note 36, at 107 (stating that the discovery process is a "sporting
match" and a "game of skill"); see also Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-Need for
Systematic Anticipation, in National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatis-
faction with the Administration of Justice, 70 F.R.D. 79, 91 (1976) (noting the wide-
spread feeling that judges tolerate lawyer abuse of the process).
71. See DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 6 (concise overview of the causes of
court delay and the problems of the court system in general); see also Johnson, supra
note 1 (anticipating over eight million new case filings and three hundred new judge-
ships per year if current trends continue).
72. See infra notes 75-91 and accompanying text (discussing the inappropriateness
of litigation in the United States).
73. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing the litigious predisposi-
tion of the U.S. society).
74. See Bork, Dealing with Overload in Article III Courts, in National Conference
on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 70
F.R.D. 79, 233 (1976) (discussing the growing burden on courts in a "welfare state");
see also DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 6 (presenting a concise overview of the
causes of court delay and the problems of the court system in general).
75. Telephone interview with the Executive Secretary's Office of the National La-
bor Relations Board, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 16, 1985). See NATIONAL LABOR RELA-
TIONS BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT (1985) (annual publication containing caseload
statistics).
76. Telephone interview with the Executive Secretary's Office of the National La-
bor Relations Board, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 16, 1985).
77. See Rosenberg, note 53, at 809 (1971) (discussing the complexity of court liti-
gation); see also C. McGOWAN, THE ORGANIZATION OF JUDICIAL POWER IN THE
UNITED STATES 99 (1967) (stating that "a comprehensive reinvestigation of the ques-
tion which human disputes belong in the courts and which ones do not is long over-
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court, complex emotion-packed and human issues are often reduced to
an adversarial assertion of specific legal rights .7  A third-party, either
the judge or jury, then proclaims a judgment to be imposed on the
litigants. Although this traditional model may successfully resolve
many disputes, it often remains an inappropriate model where personal
relationships such as family matters, ongoing personal and business re-
lationships, and moral questions are involved. 0
Non-judicial civil dispute resolution alternatives do exist and are pro-
moted on a community level.80 To this end, some larger cities are now
creating government and community organizational networks to pro-
yide specialized legal and quasi-legal dispute resolution, counselling
and assistance."" In the District of Columbia, for example, many orga-
nizations provide quasi-legal services, such as consumer protection,82 fi-
nancial counselling and mediation for creditors and debtors,8 3 family
mediation, 4 counselling on tenants' rights,8 5 and lawyer referral.8" Nu-
due"); Bork, supra note 74, at 97 (arguing that "the courts are being asked to solve
problems for which they are not institutionally equipped"). The judicial forum is of
course thought to be an appropriate forum for the resolution of many civil disputes,
particularly in cases in which serious legal rights of a party have been violated, and in
which there is a grave power disparity between disputants; see also S. LANDSMAN, THE
ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE (1984) (defending of the useful-
ness of the judicial forum).
78. Interview with Linda Singer, Director of the Washington, D.C. Center for
Community Justice, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 3, 1986).
79. Id. See Sander, Alternative Methods of Dispute Settlement: A Selected Bibli-
ography, A.B.A. CoMM. RESOLUTION OF MINOR DISPuTES 16 (1982) (providing a se-
lect bibliography on "The Adversary Process: Its Roles and Limitations").
80. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM DIRECTORY
(1985) (information on over 300 nation-wide community dispute resolution programs);
see also THE WASHINGTON, D.C. MULTI-DOOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM IN-
TAKE CENTER, REFERRAL MANUAL (1985) (listing hundreds of alternative dispute res-
olution, legal aid, and social service referrals in the Washington, D.C. area).
81. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM DIRECTORY
(1985) (information on over 300 nation-wide community dispute resolution programs);
Johnson, supra note 1, at 961-79 (discussing "the cost effectiveness of dispute resolu-
tion outside the courts"); R. COOK, J. ROEHL & D. SHEPPARD, NEIGHlBORHOOD JUS-
TICE CENTERS: FIELD TEST, FINAL EVALUATION REPORT (1980) (available at the US.
National Institute of Justice Office of Program Evaluation) (comprehensive evaluation
of the work of three Neighborhood Justice Centers).
82. See AUTOCAP, PAMPHLET (1985) (providing an example of an automotive
buyer's protection group, the Automotive Consumer Action Program (AUTOCAP)).
AUTOCAP provides consumers with free professional dispute resolution services.
83. See THE CONSUMER CREDIT COUNSELLING AND EDUCATIONAL SERVICE OF
WASHINGTON, D.C., PAMPHLET (1985) (describing the Consumer Credit Counseling
and Educational Service of Greater Washington, Inc. which offers free financial coun-
selling and negotiation assistance for individuals and creditors).
84. See THE WASHINGTON, D.C. CENTER FOR COMMUNITY JUSTICE, WHAT IS ME-
DIATION? PAMPHLET (1985) and THE WASHINGTON, D.C. CENTER FOR COMMUNITY
JUSTICE, PAMPHLET (1985) (describing the Washington, D.C. Center for Community
Justice which offers a variety of dispute resolution assistance from mediation to general
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merous others provide citizen complaint screening and referral. 7
Despite their importance, these organizations also suffer from nu-
merous shortcomings. Scarce funding88 and a lack of coordination89
often limit their effectiveness. Moreover, social services organizations
and governmental offices are frequently overburdened. 90 Large case
loads lead to impersonal service even in these "people centered" organi-
zations.9 An individual going into a community complaint center
might have to wait a number of hours before being able to meet with a
counselor, only to be referred to another community-service organiza-
tion.92 Many neighborhood legal aid programs have a great backlog of
cases during the course of a year, so that frequently they must accept
only the most serious emergency cases. 93
E. THE NON-JUDICIAL FORUM AND THE MOVEMENT FROM
LITIGATION
1. An Overview
Lack of full access to both judicial and quasi-judicial forums has led
counselling and referral).
85. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LAWYER REFERRAL AND INFORMATION SERVICE, PAM-
PHLET (1985) (describing the District of Columbia Bar Association's sponsorship of the
District of Columbia Lawyer Referral and Information Service).
86. See infra notes 125-32 and accompanying text (discussing the work of the
Multi-Door Dispute Resolution Program).
87. Telephone interview with William Martin, Assistant Director of Legal Opera-
tions, Neighborhood Legal Services Program of Washington, D.C. (Feb. 6, 1985).
88. Id. Mr. Martin noted that the public funding for the Washington, D.C. Neigh-
borhood Legal Services Program, like other community social service organizations re-
lying on public funding, is faced with continual cuts in its resources. Id. Local govern-
ments have implemented various means of raising funds for community programs
which offer alternate resolution techniques. See Minnesota Law, Ch. 489, S.F. 1666
(1982), which applied a 15% surcharge to filing fees in civil cases, the proceeds of
which would be available for legal service programs within the community.
89. Telephone interview with Janice Roehl, Vice President of the Institute for So-
cial Analysis (Sept. 19, 1985). The Institute for Social Analysis is the research center
studying the implementation of the Multi-Door Dispute Resolution Program at the va-
rious experimental sites on behalf of the American Bar Association. Id. It is among the
objectives of the Multi-Door Dispute Resolution Program to stimulate networking in
the community of social service organizations. See infra notes 125-32 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the Multi-Door Courthouse).
90. Telephone interview with Janice Roehl, Vice President of the Institute for So-
cial Analysis (Sept. 19, 1985).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Telephone interview with William Martin, Assistant Director of Legal Opera-
tions, Neighborhood Legal Services Program of Washington, D.C. (Feb. 6, 1985). The
Neighborhood Legal Services Program of Washington, D.C. had four offices (reduced
from seven), and twenty attorneys to service the 113,000 people eligible in the commu-
nity to receive its services. Id.
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to the present crisis in the justice system.94 Critics consider the judicial
system an unresponsive "monopoly". 9 5 According to these critics, the
costs and delay involved in civil litigation, as well as the court's over-
expansion into inappropriate areas for the traditional adversarial sys-
tem, amount to an actual denial of justice to civil litigants.0
As a result of this disenchantment with the traditional model, an
explosion of research and experimentation has occurred with the goal
of improving access to dispute resolution forums.97 The large number of
organizations involved in this movement include national and local bar
associations, judges' associations, the United States Department of Jus-
tice, the National Association of Dispute Resolution, individual courts,
universities, and schools.98 Their principal objectives are to improve the
present system through addressing problems of high court costs and
long delays for court hearings, and to develop new civil dispute resolu-
tion alternatives to the traditional system without the traditional flaws
and more appropriately designed for the social and moral disputes now
being handled by the courts. 9 In the spirit of the traditional civil jus-
tice reform movement, numerous governmental bodies (primarily state
legislatures) are enacting reformist measures. 100 Court reform includes
94. See National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice, 70 F.R.D. 79, 246 (1976) (conference proceedings) (recog-
nizing the crisis in the U.S. justice system and citing areas for reform).
95. See Associate Justice William H. Rehnquist, Address at the dedication of the
University of Florida Law School (Sept. 15, 1984) (available at the United States Su-
preme Court Information Service) ("Surely a government that insists on a monopoly of
the legal process, as our governments do, should be expected to provide a s)stem of
dispute adjudication that is tailored to the needs of most potential litigants who will,
voluntarily or involuntarily, make use of the system.").
96. See supra notes 50-91 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of citizen
access to civil justice through the courts and the administrative tribunal).
97. See 1970 A.B.A. TASK FORCE STANDARDS JUD. AD. 3, noted in Rosenberg,
supra note 51, at 799 (1971) ("The greatest need and opportunity for fresh effort in
judicial administration concerns the quality of justice itself. Standards and techniques
concerning court organization, procedure and management are not enough, for they do
not deal directly with the quality of justice as it reaches each individual citizen who
becomes involved with the courts as a litigant"); see also 1 011o ST. J. ON DISPUTE
RESOLUTION (1985) (containing a number of articles on the alternative dispute resolu-
tion movement); American Bar Association Special Committee on Dispute Resolution,
17 DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1985) (providing quarterly information on experimentation
in the alternative dispute resolution movement).
98. Interview with Larry Ray, Director of American Bar Association Special Com-
mittee on Dispute Resolution, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 17, 1985). See also American
Bar Association Special Committee on Dispute Resolution, 14 DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(1984) (Quarterly Information Update) (indicating the diverse organizations and type
of work involved in the alternative dispute resolution movement).
99. See Address by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, 1982 A.B.AJ. 274 (discussing
generally the need for and nature of the alternative dispute resolution movement).
100. See American Bar Association Special Committee on Dispute Resolution. 14
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anything from adding additional judges in order to deal with the large
number of disputes, 101 to passing legislation in order to streamline the
substantive law.02 Many legislatures also are implementing alterna-
tives within the local courts of original jurisdiction that provide liti-
gants with an option to adjudicate their claims in a traditional court,
before an arbitrator, or among themselves with a mediator's assis-
tance.203 Arbitration offers a dispute resolution mechanism similar to
traditional court litigation, except that procedures are much more in-
formal.10' In this proceeding, the arbitrator/judge may or may not be
more active in questioning witnesses and parties, and traditional rules
of evidence which often formalize and lengthen litigation of claims are
not necessarily observed. 0 5 Employment of attorneys in arbitration,
however, frequently is necessary. 0 6
DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1984) (providing an overview of current legislation on dispute
resolution in each of the fifty states).
101. See Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Remarks at the Opening Session of the
American Law Institute, Washington, D.C. (May 16, 1972), reprinted in QUEST FOR
JUSTICE 1973 A.B.A. COMM'N NAT. INST. JUST. 207 (commenting on some measures
taken in recent decades for the expansion of the court system through increasing the
number of judges).
102. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 980-84 (noting that such legislation appears to
take away the force of common law precedent in many cases, and limits issues in a
dispute to what may be articulated on the face of a statute); see also supra note 34 and
accompanying text (discussing the importance of the U.S. attorney in litigation). The
trend of legislating away the common law suggests a movement toward a civil law
approach to handling some disputes that appears less costly and more efficient. See
infra notes 206-209 and accompanying text (discussing the role of attorneys in the civil
law system of the Soviet Union).
103. See American Bar Association Special Committee on Dispute Resolution, 14
DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1984) (presenting an overview of legislation on dispute resolu-
tion in each of the 50 states); Mclssac, Mandatory Conciliation Custody/Visitation
Matters: California's Bold Stroke 19(2) CONCILIATION COURTS REV. 73-81 (1981)
(discussing California's mediation requirement of all custody and visitation matters).
104. H. GRILLIOT, supra note 20, at 78-84; see also Johnson, supra note 1, at 961-
79 (presenting a concise overview of arbitration).
105. Id.
106. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, THE LAWYER AND ARBITRATION
(1984) (noting that despite arbitration proceedings being typically less-formal than
court litigation, there is nevertheless the necessity for legal counsel to ensure proper
presentation of legal claims). A variation on the theme of arbitration gaining in popu-
larity in economic disputes between large companies is the Mini-Trial. AMERICAN AR-
BITRATION ASSOCIATION MINI-TRIAL PROCEDURES (1985). The Mini-Trial involves ne-
gotiation, mediation, and adjudication. Id. The adjudication is characterized by having
a panel comprised of executives of the disputants who hear claims of attorneys from
both sides, and receive counsel from an advisor who has variable levels of authority. Id.





Mediation is becoming such a popular alternative to litigation that it
merits special attention. 10 7 Mediation is a means of dispute resolution
by which disputants meet with a neutral third party who, rather than
imposing a judgment after hearing the facts and evidence in accor-
dance with 'the law,' helps the parties to work out a mutually accept-
able solution to their own problem.108 A prerequisite to the success of
mediation is that the parties are willing to communicate, reason, and
work toward a resolution of their own problem. 10 The mediator, to a
large extent, functions only to facilitate communication.' 10
Frequently, potential disputants find mediation programs attractive
in a way that litigation is not. Further, some government sponsored
mediation programs use the services of government employees and vol-
unteer mediators, so that the parties incur no cost."' No complex rules
of procedure or evidence exist in such programs as in the court system
which can hinder laymen from pursuing their own representation." 2
Moreover, without attorney involvement, laymen can avoid expensive
counsel fees. Clients can generally mediate their disputes at a mutually
convenient time; they have the freedom to compromise and negotiate
their own solutions, and to explore emotional non-legal issues particu-
larly important in on-going personal relationships. It is precisely these
qualities of mediation that make mediation an attractive alternative to
court litigation in situations involving interpersonal relations in which
the parties must live with the resolution of the dispute." 3 Many juris-
dictions are implementing court rules that foster mediation."" Media-
107. There are volumes of publications now available on mediation and its growing
importance in the alternative dispute resolution movement. See F. SANDER. Mediation:
A Select Annotated Bibliography (1984); see also Rochl & Cook, Issues in Mediation:
Rhetoric and Reality Revisited, 41 J. Soc. IssuEs 161 (1985) [hereinafter cited as
Roehl & Cook] (providing a critical analysis of mediation with a historical perspective
on its role in the alternative dispute resolution movement).
108. Interview with Linda Singer, Director of the Washington, D.C. Center for
Community Justice (Feb. 3, 1986).
109. Id.
110. Id. (emphasizing that the mediator's role is to help the parties to create an
agreement on their own terms and not to impose a resolution upon the parties as in the
courts).
111. Id. (noting the Washington, D.C. Center for Community Justice, for example.
has comprehensive training programs to certify community volunteer mediators to work
in the D.C. Mediation Service).
112. Id.
113. Id. These types of disputes include conflicts between family members, employ-
ers and employees, neighbors, and students and teachers. Id.
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1982) (creating the Legal Service's Corporation) The
Legal Service's Corporation, like its predecessor the Office of Economic Opportunity
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tion is particularly well-suited where interpersonal relations, such as
family matters are involved, or in cases dealing with small amounts of
money where costs do not justify recourse to the courts. In such situa-
tions, either law or the discretion of a judge may require parties to
attempt mediation of their dispute as a prerequisite to bringing a claim
before a court.1 515
Other legislators are looking to improve access to the traditional
court system by increasing the accessibility of the courts particularly
for the poor by providing subsidized legal services. For example, as a
result of the Legal Services Corporation, legal services exist for needy
individuals. Among the philosophical goals of these programs is the
ideal that providing legal services to the poor is the responsibility for
the entire community, and that lawyers themselves are obligated to
participate in pro bono service programs as evidence of the professional
bar's community conscience.116 These programs however, like many
other community legal aid centers, are underfinanced and
overburdened.1 17 Other less conservative reformists are attempting to
promote a long-term change in the entire nature of dispute resolution
in American society.118 It is thought by many that the image and role
of lawyers in the justice system must change; rather than holding legal
positions in a courtroom and arguing complex rules of law, lawyers
must focus on solutions to problems much as would a mediator.119 Re-
(OEO) Legal Services Programs exemplifies an attempt to bring legal assistance to the
poor who could not otherwise afford it. See Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (1964) (repealed)). Both Acts have provided funding and
organizational support for the establishment of neighborhood legal aid programs
throughout the country. See M. CAPPELLE TI, J. GORDLEY & E. JOHNSON, TOWARD
EQUAL JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL AID IN MODERN SOCIETIES 523
(1975) (noting that statistics indicate that at the time of the adoption of the OEO Act,
there only had been one legal aid program in 2,900 of the 3,100 U.S. counties); Chris-
tensen, supra note 63, at 101 "[T]he advent of OEO Legal Services, with its infusion
of money, lawyers, and new methods into the system by which legal services were deliv-
ered to the poor, demonstrated that previous estimates of need and prior efforts at
service have been hopelessly inadequate. In fact, OEO Legal Services has uncovered a
demand for legal services far in excess of even the system's new delivery capacity.").
115. See supra note 79 (providing numerous examples of legislation incorporating
mediation programs into traditional dispute resolution forums).
116. See Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the Indi-
vidual Lawyer and of the Organized Bar, 12 UCLA L. REV. 438 (1965) (discussing
the role of the social responsibility of the lawyer); Johnson, supra note 1, at 1021 (dis-
cussing the role of the professional bar in providing pro bono legal services).
117. Interview with Larry Ray, Director of the American Bar Association Special
Committee on Dispute Resolution, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 19, 1985).
118. See infra notes 117 and 120 (discussing the need for lawyers to change their
approach to dispute resolution).
119. Interview with Linda Singer, Director of the Washington, D.C. Center for
Community Justice, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 3, 1986). See D. Brink, Comments at a
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lated to this change, the accountability of the judicial system and the
professionalized bar must become more attuned to the need of society
as a whole.1 20 The judicial system cannot function independently and
above the common layperson, but must become more integrated into
the lives of and accessible to all citizens.121 United States attorneys are
beginning to recognize the demise of their own elite system of profes-
sionalized civil justice.1 22 Most importantly, however, to advance all of
these changes, the attitudes of the general public must change.123 In an
effort to address many of these concerns, the American Bar Association
has designed the Multi-Door Dispute Resolution Program.
3. The Multi-Door Courthouse
The Multi-Door Dispute Resolution Program is an experimental pro-
ject first envisioned by Professor Frank Sander of Harvard University
Law School. 2 Professor Sander advocated the development of a com-
munity dispute resolution center within local courthouses that would
help individuals assess their legal disputes as well as determine the ap-
propriate forum within the community. Within this structure, litigation
would be only one of many alternatives.125 In 1981, the American Bar
Association Special Committee on Dispute Resolution began the pro-
Workshop of the ABA Young Lawyers Division and the ABA Special Committee of
Dispute Resolution, reprinted in Alternative Dispute Resolution: Bane or Boon to At-
torneys? 1982 A.B.A. SPECIAL COMM. DIspTrrE RESOLUTION 13 (envisioning the "day
when attorneys will be viewed as counsellors, problem solvers, and deliverers of prompt,
appropriate, and affordable justice.").
120. See J. AUERBACH, supra note 30 (analysis of the history of the professional-
ized bar as an elite organization elevated above service of the needs of the common
citizen).
121. Id.
122. See A. Williams Cox, Comments made at a Workshop of the ABA Young
Lawyers Division and the ABA Special Committee of Dispute Resolution (1982), re-
printed in Alternative Dispute Resolution: Bane or Boon to Attorneys? 1982 A.B.A.
SPECIAL CoMM. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 70 (arguing that attorneys will lose business if
they do not adopt changes that satisfy consumers); see also J. AUERBACH, supra note
30, at 263-306 (1976) (discussing the disintegration of legal authority of the profes-
sionalized bar).
123. See Ronald L. Olson, Comments made at a Workshop of the ABA Young
Lawyers Division and the ABA Special Committee of Dispute Resolution (1982), re-
printed in Alternative Dispute Resolution: Bane or Boon to Attorneys? 1982 A.B.A.
SPECIAL CoriM. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 3 (stating that alternative dispute resolution's
success depends on an informed public); see also J. AUERBACH, supra note 30, at 263-
306 (discussing the disintegration of legal authority of the professionalized bar).
124. See National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice, 70 F.R.D. 79 (1976); Sander, The Multi-Door Courthouse:
Settling Disputes in the year 2000, 3(3) THE BARRISTER 18 (1976) (presenting
Sander's conception of the Multi-Door Courthouse of the future).
125. Sander, supra note 124.
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ject of implementing programs in different cities to initiate the study
and development of what has become known as the "Multi-Door
Courthouse. ' 126 During 1984 and 1985, experimental community pro-
grams in the spirit of the Multi-Door Courthouse began work in Tulsa,
Oklahoma, Houston, Texas, and the District of Columbia, each having
different sponsorship, funding, and design.127
Generally, the program seeks to address many of the criticisms of the
court system; the program hopes to divert disputes away from the
courts and to promote use (and development) of the least costly, most
time-efficient and appropriate means available for resolving disputes.1 2 8
Hopefully, the program will help unburden the court system, foster the
use and development of dispute resolution alternatives to litigation, and
encourage individuals to work toward independent resolution of
problems without depending on (and paying for) the services of an ad-
vocate or judge. 1 2
126. Telephone interview with Janice Roehl, Vice President of the Institute for So-
cial Analysis, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 19, 1985); see also Sander, supra note 124
(presenting his conception of the Multi-Door Courthouse).
127. Telephone interview with Janice Roehl, Vice President of the Institute for So-
cial Analysis, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 19, 1985).
128. See Ray & Clare, The Multi-Door Courthouse Idea: Building the Court-
house Idea: Building the Courthouse of the Future. . . Today, I OHIO ST. J. oN
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 7 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Ray] (comprehensive).
129. Id. The Washington, D.C. Multi-Door Program presently has three principal
components: an Intake and Referral Center located in the D.C. Superior Courthouse, a
Small Claims mediation program, and a Domestic Relations mediation program. At
the Intake and Referral Center, walk-in clients meet with Intake Specialists who dis-
cuss and evaluate each client's dispute, and in appropriate cases, counsel the client on
dispute resolution alternatives within the court or the community. See Ray & Clare,
supra note 128 (presenting a comprehensive overview of the work and objectives of the
Multi-Door Program Intake and Referral Centers). The work of the Multi-Door Intake
Center is largely directed to helping people involved in disputes find alternatives to
litigation, and on a large scale, educating District of Columbia citizens about dispute
resolution alternatives. Interview with Linda Finkelstein, Director of the Washington,
D.C. Multi-Door Dispute Resolution Program. As noted, the Program also has trained
mediators who offer mediation without cost to individuals who have Small Claims dis-
putes. Id. Also, the Center has mediators specially trained to mediate most Domestic
Relations disputes. Id. The Intake and Referral Center is the focal point of the early
study and development of the project known as the '18-month Phase I' period. Tele-
phone Interview with Janice Roehl, Vice President of the Institute for Social Analysis,
Washington, D.C. (Sept. 19, 1985); see also Ray & Clare, supra note 128 (presenting
a comprehensive overview of the work and objectives of the Multi-Door Program In-
take and Referral Centers). The primary goals of the work of the Phase I period as
defined by the ABA are to study client referral, increase community awareness of dis-
pute resolution alternatives to litigation, and examine the effectiveness of community
dispute resolution alternatives within the respective communities. Telephone Interview
with Janice Roehl, Vice President of the Institute for Social Analysis, Washington,
D.C. (Sept. 19, 1985). Information gained by this preliminary study will enable the
Program sponsors to decide which type of disputes ought to be left for resolution in the
courts and which type of disputes might be better resolved in another way, and to
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Although the D.C. Multi-Door Program is still in its early stages, it
has already had notable success. The work of the Intake Center pro-
motes of the use of programs in the D.C. Superior Court and in the
community offer alternatives to litigation.130 It may be inferred that the
counsellors in this program must confront both the litigious pre-disposi-
tion of many clients and the blind faith in the ready justice of the legal
system of many others. Depending on the specific client, the Program
specialist might have to illuminate realities (disadvantages) of litiga-
tion, the uncertainty of the law on numerous matters, and dispel myths
about the nature of the legal system. Participating in the Multi-Door
Program is a broadening, educational experience on dispute resolution
activities. 131
4. Some Criticisms of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement
Many social critics who are resistent to the change consider alterna-
tive dispute resolution second class justice.1 32 Critics contend that non-
lawyer mediators are "amateur [legal] practitioners,"' 3 3 and are inca-
pable of providing the same quality justice as traditional courts.13 4
Other critics note that mediation, sometimes imposed upon the dispu-
tants by legislation or policy, 135 forces disputants having a relative
power disparity to resolve disputes without the protection of due pro-
cess preserved by court proceedings for the weaker party, 36 especially
when the mediator might also pressure the parties to reach agree-
ment.13 7 Despite mediation's increasing popularity, even its defenders
develop other alternative methods of dispute resolution for problems in which the com-
munities presently lack sufficient dispute resolution support. Id.
130. Linda Finkelstein, Director of the Washington, D.C. Multi-Door Dispute Res-
olution Program.
131. Id.
132. See Roehl & Cook, supra note 107, at 171-75 (exploring the thesis that medi-
ation provides a second-class justice with reference to numerous authorities).
133. See H. BELLIAN, DISPUTE RSOLUrIoN FORUM 3 (1983), cited in C.
Schweber & J. Peter, Who are the Neutrals? An Examination of the C.D.R. and Arbi-
tration Volunteer at the Dispute Settlement Center in Buffalo, N.Y. (Paper presented
at the National Conference on Peace Making and Conflict Resolution, St. Louis, Mo.)
(Sept. 21, 1984).
134. Id.
135. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing legislation requiring
mediation attempts for certain disputes in the various state jurisdictions).
136. See SINGER, THE GROWTH OF NON-JUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: SPECU-
LATIONS ON THE EFFECTS OF JUSTICE FOR THE POOR AND ON THE ROLE OF LEGAL
SERVICES (1979), cited in Roehl & Cook, supra note 107 (noting the problems of
power disparities in mediation).
137. See Roehl & Cook, supra note 107, at 174 (suggesting that if mediators do
exercise undue influence upon the parties to settle their dispute, it would be an error in
their training rather than a flaw in the process itself).
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concede that it is not a universal solution to the legal system's
problems.188 Moreover, some fear that alternative dispute resolution fo-
rums will provoke the wealthy to desert the courts, and eventually
lower the quality of the judicial system.'39 Others fear that the alterna-
tive dispute resolution movement will result in consensual but lawless
justice.140 Ironically, popular dependency on the traditional adversary
system serves as a spring-board bringing many of the clients to the
D.C. Superior Courthouse's Multi-Door Intake Center, yet it is exactly
this fundamental dependency which the work of the Intake Center
strives to dispel.
F. SUMMARY OF THE U.S. SYSTEM
Part I of this study has focused upon access to civil justice in the
United States. The United States government guarantees access to civil
justice only implicitly through constitutional and legislative guarantees.
The judicial forum remains the primary alternative for civil dispute
resolution. High litigation costs, delays in processing claims, and the
system's inappropriateness for many types of civil disputes diminish ac-
cess to this forum. Delays stem from court overload, traceable to over-
reliance on courts as dispute resolution forums, and the litigious nature
of the American society. The litigation model's inappropriateness for
the resolution of many civil disputes primarily rests with the legal/ad-
versarial nature of the system. Many civil disputes, particularly those
involving complex issues of ongoing personal relations, require a more
human, flexible, person-oriented form of dispute resolution. Moreover,
the formal court proceedings are not always necessary to resolve more
minor disputes. Although quasi-judicial forums exist in administrative
agencies, they suffer from the same problems of high cost and delay.
As a result of these criticisms, a revolution in dispute resolution has
begun. This revolution focuses on a search for new forms of non-judi-
cial dispute resolution methods lacking the faults of the existing sys-
tem. Reforms include implementation of arbitration and mediation pro-
grams which represent less-formal, less-costly, and more consensual
forms of dispute resolution. Reforms also include the search for full
138. See A. Davis, Justice without Judges: Law in the 1980's (available at the
American Bar Association Special Committee on Dispute Resolution, Washington,
D.C. 1983) (defending the court's "historic role in applying public norms, setting
precedents, protection and extending rights and acting as deterrents").
139. See DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 6, at 51-55 (1984) (suggesting the pos-
sibility of the wealthy creating their own private high class dispute resolution forums).




utilization, study, and renovation of available community dispute reso-
lution alternatives as well as the development of new alternatives. The
Multi-Door Program exemplifies not only an attempt to encourage full
utilization of existing community alternatives through client referral,
but also an attempt to educate the ordinary citizen and to dispel the
social predisposition to rely on the judicial forum" for the resolution of
disputes.
II. ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN THE SOVIET UNION
A. GUARANTEES TO AccEss: THE SoviET CONSTITUTION AND
LEGISLATION
The 1977 Constitution of the Soviet Union14 1 guarantees access to
civil justice in some matters but, like the United States Constitution,
does not define the Government's duty to provide an effective civil jus-
tice system.'42 The Constitution, however, recognizes the courts' role in
Soviet society to effectively administer justice and guarantee access for
citizens.143 Further, to preserve the integrity of the justice system, Arti-
cle 156 of the Constitution provides that "justice is administered in the
U.S.S.R. on the principle of the equality of citizens before the law and
the court." 4 Article 159 guarantees the right to "the services of an
interpreter" in judicial proceedings.143 Importantly, unlike in the
United States Constitution, Article 161 explicitly guarantees the avail-
ability of legal assistance, and in certain cases free legal representa-
141. See U.S.S.R. CONST., reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD (A. Blau-
stein & G. Flanz trans. 1971) (translation into English).
142. Id. See generally Zivs & Melnikov, supra note 1 (discussing constitutional
and legislative guarantees for Soviet citizen access to civil justice).
143. See U.S.S.R. CONST., supra note 141, at art. 151 (stating that justice is ad-
ministered only by the courts). An assumption of this study is that "civil justice" has a
broader definition than the enforcement of civil law in the courts. This study assumes
that the achievement of civil justice, a "just" and satisfactory resolution of civil dis-
putes, may be realized through utilization not only of the courts but also government
agencies, social organizations and consensual methods of private resolution between
disputants.
Article 151 of the Soviet Constitution, however, appears to contradict this assump-
tion which places the power of justice solely within the judicial structure. Article 163
appears to contradict article 151, however, which places resolution of economic dis-
putes between enterprises (which are in fact civil disputes) within the jurisdiction of
state arbitration bodies. See Chechot, Judicial Protection of Subjective Rights and
Interests, 8 SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO 4 (1967), cited in SoviET LEGAL SYS-
TEM, supra note 7, at 126 (discussing the various types of dispute resolution forums in
the Soviet society).
144. U.S.S.R. CONST., supra note 141, at art. 156
145. Id. at art. 159.
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tion. 4 6 Unlike the Soviet Constitution, the Soviet civil procedure code
explicitly obligates the Soviet State to provide an effective system of
civil justice.147 Like the Constitution, the civil procedure code also
guarantees equal protection of the rights of all parties under the civil
law.148
B. THE JUDICIAL FORUM
1. The Role of the Courts
The Soviet Constitution, unlike the' United States Constitution, ex-
plicitly provides for the establishment of numerous types of courts. 40
This constitutional provision for various types of courts, however, is
somewhat ironic given Communist dogma that courts represent a bour-
geois vehicle of class oppression which should wither away with the
state.'50 Nevertheless, the Soviet society has accepted the judicial
structure as a necessary instrument of social order.""'
The Soviet Constitution of 1936 established the guiding principles of
the present-day judiciary.152 The Judiciary Act of 1938 complemented
these principles with the structure of a developed court system.5 3 The
Soviet court system's organization reflects, to a large extent, that of the
judicial system in the United States. There are two similar bodies of
courts; one for the U.S.S.R. and the other for each of the autonomous
regions. 15 Each body of courts has essentially three levels: courts of
146. Id. at art. 161 ("[c]olleges of advocates are available to give legal assistance
to citizens and organizations. In cases provided for by legislation citizens shall be given
legal assistance free of charge").
147. See Zivs & Melnikov, supra note 1, at 644 (stating that the aim of the civil
code is to guarantee that Soviet civil procedure settles civil cases rapidly and correctly).
The Soviet civil procedure code further charges the courts with the obligation to exer-
cise measures which would prevent the occurrence of civil disputes through the educa-
tion of Soviet citizens on the "strict observance of Soviet laws and the rules of the
socialist communal life." Id. at 653.
148. Id.
149. U.S.S.R. CoNsT., supra note 141, at art. 151 (providing for the Supreme
Court of the U.S.S.R., the Supreme Courts of Union Republics, the Supreme Courts of
Autonomous Republics, Territorial, Regional, and city courts, courts of Autonomous
Regions, courts of Autonomous Areas, district (city) people's courts, and military
tribunals in the armed forces).
150. Zivs & Melnikov, supra note 1, at 653 (reproducing relevant text of art. 151
of the U.S.S.R. Const.). See J. HAZARD, SETTLING DISPUTES IN SOVIET SOCIETY 481
(1978) (discussing the Soviet observation of the class nature of court administered
justice).
151. Id.
152. See G. GuINs, SovIEr LAW AND SovIEr SOCIETY 315 (1954) (presenting his-
torical background on the Soviet judiciary).
153. Id.
154. Interview with Louise I. Shelly, Professor of Soviet Law at the Washington
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original jurisdiction, an intermediate court level having both appellate
and some original jurisdiction, and a supervisory or superior level.",
The function of the appellate forums, however, differs from United
States' practice. Appeals are rarely granted except under specific cir-
cumstances defined by statute, at the discretion of the state attorneys
(procurators), or the courts themselves."' The Supreme Court of the
U.S.S.R. accepts final appeals and is the supreme federal court.
2. The Interrelationship of Law, Justice, and the Courts
Despite the explicit power that the Soviet Constitution grants to the
Soviet courts to administer justice, and its similar structure to the
United States judiciary, their relationship to the role of law in Soviet
society and to the actual administration of justice is very different than
those relationships in the United States . 57
These differences may be partly explained by the distinction between
the capitalist and socialist systems and between the common and civil
law. Philosophically, Soviet law does not have an independent moral or
political force of its own.1 58 Law in the U.S.S.R. does not define immu-
table individual rights nor express lasting moral doctrine.",0 The law,
rather, is a social tool of the executive and legislative governing bodies
used to fulfill the Communist Party objectives.160
College of Law, The American University, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 18. 1985).
155. Id.
156. Id. See Zivs & Melnikov, supra note I (presenting a general discussion of
civil appeals of judgments).
157. See supra notes 30-40 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the inter-
relationship of law, justice, and the United States).
158. See V. GsovsKI, SovIET CIVIL LAW, PRIVATE RIGHTS AND THEIR BkcK-
GROUND UNDER THE SOVIET REGIME 163 (1948) (noting that "[m]istrust of the law as
an independent social force was deeply rooted in Marxian philosophy as it was origi-
nally understood by many Soviet jurists").
159. See A. VYSHINSKII, TEORIA SUDEBNYKH DOKAZATELSTV V SOVETSKOM PRAVE
125-127 (1946), cited in G. GUINs, supra note 152, at 326 ("We . . . reject every
attempt, grounded on the idea that the moral world has its permanent principles stand-
ing above history and national differences, to press on us any moral dogma in the form
of eternal, final, immutable moral law").
160. See K. HULICKA & I. HULICKA, SOVIET INSTITUTIONS: THE INDIVIDUAL AND
SOCIETY 278 (1967) [hereinafter cited as K. HULICKA & I. HULICKAJ (stating that
Soviet law is an instrument of the Party); see also Principles of Civil Legislation of the
U.S.S.R. and the Union Republics, IZVESTIA, Dec. 10, 1961, at 3-6. 20, cited in K.
HULICKA & I. HULICKA, at 326; H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R.: AN INTERPRE-
TATION OF SOVIET LAW 379 (1982) (presenting a general discussion on the role of law
in the Soviet society).
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3. The "Democratization" of the Soviet Courts
Unlike their American counterparts, Soviet courts retain no monop-
oly over dispute resolution. Despite Article 151 of the Soviet Constitu-
tion which states that courts administer justice, in reality all social or-
ganizations play a role.161 The Soviet bar contributes to this people-
centered approach. In the Soviet Union, litigants most often represent
themselves, 1 2 but even where an individual seeks an attorney, litigation
does not necessarily result. An individual who has a legal problem goes
to the conmunity bar office to discuss the matter with a lawyer.1,6 Re-
quests for counsel may occur if an individual has a professional rela-
tionship with a specific attorney.'" Otherwise, the bar office manager
will appoint an attorney.168 After discussion of the legal problem, the
attorney will advise the individual whether a violation of the law at
issue appears to exist, and whether it would be advisable to file a
suit."6 ' Although the attorney and client might decide that a suit would
be advisable, the parties may conclude that an alternative form of dis-
pute resolution is more appropriate.16 7 In sum, the Soviet local bar of-
fices function much like the screening center at the Multi-Door Pro-
gram would if it were staffed by attorneys rather than neutral referral
counsellors.168
One practical reason for the need for individuals to represent them-
selves in court is the shortage of attorneys. In the Soviet Union, there is
161. See Rules of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, as adopted by the
Twenty-second Communist Party Congress (Oct. 31, 1961), reprinted in IZVESTIA,
Nov. 3, 1961, cited in SoviET LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 11 ("[tjhe law of all the
people is characterized by the expansion and deepening of the process of democratiza-
tion. It is manifest in the fact that all classes and social groups of Soviet society have
exactly the same status in law.").
162. One practical reason individuals represent themselves in court is the shortage
of attorneys. See Huskey, The Limits to Institutional Autonomy in the Soviet Union:
The Case of the Advocatura, 34 SOVIET STUDIES 200 (1982) (presenting an overview
of the professional bar). According to Huskey, there is only one trained advocate for
every 13,000 citizens. Id.




166. Id. (noting that suits will be brought to court (generally the Peoples' Court) if
the attorney advises the client that there is an alleged violation of a specific code; other-
wise, the client might be referred to an alternative quasi-judicial or non-judicial dispute
resolution forum); see infra notes 241-62 (discussing the Comrades' Courts and non-
judicial dispute resolution alternatives).
167. Interview with former Soviet citizen, supra note 163.




only one trained lawyer for every 13,000 citizens.1 69 Attorneys in the
Soviet Union, play a much less important role in assisting individuals in
following correct court procedures and presenting proper evidence and
arguments to the judge than in the United States .17  Because of their
civil law system, Soviet courts do not consider complex precedent in a
given matter.17 1 Procedures'for numerous "routine" types of social dis-
putes, moreover, are streamlined for efficient application.' 7 2 Common
civil cases, for example, such as suits for divorce, alimony and inheri-
tance do not result in complex controversy nor require a sophisticated
legal analysis.17 3
To compensate for the lack of counsel for many civil litigants, Soviet
courts have much less formal rules of civil procedure, and judges are
authorized to play a much more active role in the investigation of facts
and in the settlement of claims than in the United States.'7 4 The court
also has the discretion to summon parties or to remove a plaintiff or
defendant and replace them with another party without interrupting
the suit."'
Concepts of legality that appellate courts enforce in certain in-
stances, however, limit a judge's discretion. 176 Further, a judge's con-
169. Huskey, The Limits to Institutional Autonomy in the Soviet Union: The case
of the Advocatura, 34 SovIEr STUDIES 200, 201 (1982).
170. Interview with Louise I. Shelley, Professor of Soviet Law, Washington College
of Law, The American University, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 18, 1985); Interview with
former Soviet citizen, supra note 163. The former Soviet citizen noted that attorneys
were superfluous in many simpler civil actions and that the preliminary advice offered
on points of law and court procedure by attorneys at community bar offices sufficed to
prepare a layperson to carry forward their own claim. See Puchinskiy, supra note 1, at
825 (discussing the inexpensiveness of civil litigation in the Soviet Union, particularly
in light of the near absence of attorneys' fees); L. SHELLEY, LAW'EaRS IN SovIEr
WORK LIFE 30 (1984) (discussing the types of enterprise, legal assistants, and their
level of legal education).
171. Id. (discussing the inexpensiveness of civil litigation in the Soviet Union).
172. Interview with Louise I. Shelley, Professor of Soviet Law at the Washington
College of Law, The American University, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 18, 1985).
173. See G. GuINs, supra note 152, at 316 (presenting an overview of judicial ad-
ministration in the Soviet system with specific reference to the simplicity of civil
actions).
174. See The RFSFR Fundamentals of Civil Procedure, art. 16 ("A court is re-
quired, without limiting itself to the evidence and explanations that have been intro-
duced to take all measures provided by law to clarify from all sides, completely and
objectively the real circumstances of a case, the rights and duties, warning them of the
consequences of committing or not committing procedural acts and must provide them
assistance in defending their rights").
175. See Zivs & Melnikov, supra note 1, at 648 (discussing the judges' broad dis-
cretion in managing a suit).
176. See Zivs & Melnikov, supra note I, at 649 (defining the role of the procurator
in a civil action). RFSFR Fundamentals of Civil Procedure, art. 12 notes that "[i]n a
civil trial, the procurator sees to it that the court precludes the infringement of a sub-
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duct is subject to review by a government attorney (the procurator). 17
For example, Article 15 empowers the procurator to remedy violations
of law.17 8
Even where a dispute ends in litigation, the role of the layperson in
the Soviet court helps to democratize the system. The majority of civil
cases, primarily property disputes and family matters, come under the
jurisdiction of the People's Courts.17 '9 The People's Courts have one
State-appointed judge, and two people's assessors elected on the basis
of universal suffrage. 180 At court, people's assessors have all the rights
of a judge.181 Although people's assessors may be compared to the jury
in the United States,182 the people's assessors' role differs greatly from
that of the American style jury. People's assessors are entitled to full
participation in the trial, 83 interact directly with the litigants,184 and
are generally not shielded from the dispute by the theatrics of the at-
torneys and the formalities of the courtroom. 85
C. THE SUCCESS OF THE JUDICIAL FORUM
1. An Overview
Unlike the United States judicial system, therefore, civil justice and
the law in the Soviet Union are brought down to the level of the layper-
son not only by their philosophical role of law in society, but also by
the nature of the court process which is conceived as a social vehicle
jective right, that the laws are strictly observed in the activities of the parties and of
the other participants in the legal procedure, and that the court's judgment is lawful
and well-grounded, i.e., that it is made in conformity with the factual circumstances of
the case and the rules of procedure, and is based on the facts established before the
court during the proceedings."
177. Id.
178. See id. at 649 (discussing the affirmative duties of a procurator).
179. See K. HULICKA & I. HULICKA, supra note 160, at 291 (stating that People's
Courts are courts of original jurisdiction).
180. U.S.S.R. CONST., supra note 141, at art. 152; see also K. HULICKA & I. Hu-
LICKA, supra note 160, at 293 (stating that cases of original jurisdiction in the interme-
diate courts are also heard by a judge and two people's assessors, though appeals in the
intermediate courts are heard by three judge panels).
181. U.S.S.R. CONST., supra note 141, at art. 154.
182. Id. at amend. VII.
183. Id. at art. 152.
184. Id. (discussing the role of the People's Assessor in Soviet civil litigation).
185. See supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of use of
attorneys in the Soviet Union for the resolution of civil disputes). But see Los, The
Myth of Popular Justice Under Communism: A Comparative View of the U.S.S.R.
and Poland, 2 JusT. Q. 442, 449-54 (1985) (depicting the Peoples' Assessors' role in




whereby civil justice is achieved. 186 Further, unlike its American coun-
terpart, the Soviet civil justice system functions well.187 Access to civil
justice is not prevented by costly legal fees, nor by court overload and
delay.188 Moreover, the Soviet system often promises a more "appropri-
ate" forum for the resolution of civil disputes, 69 than in the United
States. 190
2. The Lack of Cost
Court costs in the Soviet Union are minimal."" Similarly, the costs
of an attorney are far less than in the United States.10 2 There are four
classes of attorneys in the Soviet Union: the notary, the advokatura
(private attorney), the iuriskonsult (in-house counsel to an enterprise)
and the procuracy (government attorney).10, 3 The government pays the
advokatura a salary and generally the advokatura does not earn income
from individual civil cases. 94 The fees for their services are paid di-
rectly to the counselling office.lee
The iuriskonsult also performs an important function in providing
low cost legal consultation to business enterprises, and free legal assis-
186. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (discussing the question whether
art. 51 of the U.S.S.R. Const. demands that Soviet justice be administered only by the
courts).
187. See Zivs & Melnikov, supra note I, at 645 (commenting on the Soviet sys-
tem's ability to provide quality civil justice to its citizens).
188. See infra notes 187-200 and accompanying text (discussing the "accessibility"
of the Soviet courts).
189. See infra notes 200-09 and accompanying text (discussing the appropriateness
of the Soviet forum).
190. See supra notes 75-91 and accompanying text (discussing the inappropriate-
ness of the American system in some instances).
191. Interview with former Soviet citizen, supra note 161; Interview with Louise I.
Shelley, Professor of Soviet Law, Washington College of Law, The American Univer-
sity, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 18, 1985); see also Puchinskiy. supra note I, at 819-20
(discussing the low court costs involved in litigation in the Soviet Union); Zivs &
Melnikov, supra note 1, at 648 (discussing the low costs associated with the civil
action).
192. Compare Puchinskiy supra note 1, at 825 (discussing the low cost of attor-
neys) with notes 65-77 supra and accompanying text (discussing costs involved in the
United States system).
193. Louise I. Shelley, "Soviet Law" course lecture at the Washington College of
Law, The American University, Washington, D.C. (Fall, 1985).
194. Interview with former Soviet citizen, supra note 163; Interview with Louise 1.
Shelley, Professor of Soviet Law, Washington College of Law. The American Univer-
sity, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 18, 1985). See Puchinskiy. supra note 1, at 825-27 (not-
ing that two-thirds of those seeking legal advice in the Russian Soviet Federated So-
cialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) received it without charge).
195. Interview with Louise I. Shelley, Professor of Soviet Law, Washington College
of Law, The American University, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 18. 1985).
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tance to individual employees. 96 The iuriskonsult provides effective
free legal advice to employees similar to the function of the advocatura
in community legal offices. 197 Their presence not only improves the life
of individual employees, but also provides preventive legal counsel to an
enterprise. 98 It must be noted, however, that the civil dispute resolu-
tion role of the iuriskonsult has not realized its full potential because of
the low supply of attorneys in the Soviet Union. 9 "
3. The Lack of Delay
Soviet courts seek to minimize delay.200 Procedural rules call for in-
formality and simplicity.201 Article II of the Russian Soviet Federated
Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) Fundamentals of Civil Procedure states
that Soviet courts must "[examine correctly and rapidly] and settle
civil cases so as to protect the citizens' political, labor, housing and
other personal property rights and vested interests. 20 2 Eighty to ninety
per cent of the civil cases are "completed" within thirty days after fil-
ing of a suit. 20 3 Procedures for the enforcement of judgments in the
Soviet Union are similar to those in the United States, and generally
196. See L. SHELLEY, LAWYERS IN SOVIET WORK LIFE (1984) (noting that
"[b]ecause Soviet workplaces are more than simply places of employment but arc also
institutions that often provide for the housing, medical, and recreational needs of their
employees, it is only natural that their workers will look to the staff of the workplace
organization for the resolution of many of their problems").
197. Id. (presenting a comprehensive overview of the role of the iuriskonsult).
198. Id.
199. See Iuridicheskaia sluzhba prepriiatii, 1 Pravda (Moscow) (July 29,1982),
cited in L. SHELLEY, LAWYERS IN SOVIET WORK LIFE 37 (1984) (stating that more
than half the enterprises and organizations have only a part-time iuriskonsult).
200. Although Soviet procedural rules require that civil suits be processed quickly,
no data exists testing their success.
201. See SOvIET LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 29 (discussing the rules of civil
procedure).
202. See The R.S.F.S.R. Fundamentals of Civil Procedure, art. 99, cited in
Melnikov & Zivs, supra note 1, at 655. Zivs and Melnikov note:
Besides the general time-limit, the codes have shorter time-limits for the trial of
some cases which concern the citizens' most important interests. For instance,
cases on the deduction of an allowance, compensation for damage caused by an
injury or other harm to the health or by a breadwinner's death, and cases arising
out of labor relations, must be examined by the courts of first instance within ten
days if the parties concerned are in the same city or district, and within twenty
days, in other instances, from the day the claim was submitted.Id.
203. See Summary Discussions of Florence Conference on Fundamental Guaran-
tees of the Parties in Civil Litigation, 2d Sess. (comments of Prof. Ziv), in FUNDAMEN-
TAL GUARANTEES OF THE PARTIES IN CIVIL LITIGATION 781, 794 (M. Cappelletti & D.
Tallon eds. 1973) (noting the lack of delay in the Soviet civil system). But see Zivs &
Melnikov, supra note 1, at 655 (stating that the Turkmen Code requires resolution of
general civil disputes within twenty days).
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provide for expeditious collection. 0 Violations of time limits result in
disciplinary action taken by higher courts against tardy judges. 20 5
4. The Appropriateness of the Judicial Forum
Lastly, the Soviet courts lack the 'inhuman' and alienating atmo-
sphere sometimes noted in the United States courts;200 procedures and
rules of evidence are not complex,2 and lawyers are not essential. 205
The local community elects the people's assessors. Both assessors and
judges are considered to be active and sympathetic. 20" The Soviet
courts, therefore, though not always necessary for the resolution of nu-
merous disputes of a moral and personal nature (often because of the
existence of other social organizations for the resolution of such dis-
putes),210 are nevertheless better adapted to settle such disputes than
courts in the United States.
Alternative forums for dispute resolution within the court system in-
clude the possible referral of litigants before the People's Courts to a
third party umpire 2 similar to trial before an arbitrator in the United
States. 12 Use of the umpire is optional for the litigants .2 ' An umpire
has jurisdiction to hear a claim regardless of amounts in controversy
and will make a public ruling.2 1 The umpire is selected by the parties,
and their decision is binding and final unless both parties agree to sub-
204. See Zivs & Melnikov, supra note 1, at 651 (referencing collection of
judgments).
205. See 5 BULLETIN OF THE U.S.S.R. SUPREME COURT 1011 (1967), cited in Zivs
& Melnikov, supra note 1, at 657 (discussing enforcement of time limitations against
lower court judges).
206. See supra notes 55-91 and accompanying text (discussing alienation in the
United States system).
207. See G. GUINS, supra note 152, at 316 (discussing the atmosphere of the Soviet
courts).
208. See supra notes 161-73 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of neces-
sity for lawyers in the Soviet civil justice system).
209. See GORSHENIN, THE NEW SoviET LAW ON THE JUDICIAL Svs-rut (1982), in
FUNDAMENTALS OF SOVIET CRIMINAL LEGISLATION 55-56, cited in K. HULICKA & 1.
HULICKA, supra note 160, at 292 ("[s]ince the people's assessors come from the people
and have their confidence, they are able to introduce the wisdom of the people, exper-
iences gained in life, into the work of the court, and are also able to delve deeply and
understandingly into the bewildering complexity of human relations, into the circum-
stances attending any criminal or civil case").
210. See infra notes 242-46 and accompanying text (discussing non-judicial forums
for civil dispute resolution in the Soviet Union).
211. Volozhanin, More Attention to Third Party Umpires, in 5 SOVIETSKAIA IlUs-
TITsiiA 11 (1981), cited in SovIET LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 7. at 25 (presenting an
overview of the role of the third-party umpire).
212. Id. See supra notes 101-04 (discussing arbitration in the United Statcs).
213. Volozhanin, supra note 211.
214. Id.
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mit the case for later review before a People's Court.2
These virtues of the Soviet judiciary would alone indicate the superi-
ority of the Soviet civil justice system over the United States system,
but the Soviet Union, like the United States, also has numerous well-
established quasi-judicial and non-judicial organs designed for the reso-
lution of disputes.
D. THE QUASI-JUDICIAL FORUM
1. The Administrative Tribunal
Article 163 of the Soviet Constitution provides for the establishment
of state arbitration tribunals for economic disputes between enterprises,
institutions and organizations.2 16 There are two principal arbitration
boards,217 each having their own areas of jurisdiction. State arbitration
tribunals have jurisdiction over property and contract disputes between
enterprises of different regional economic counsels and different minis-
tries.2 18 Departmental arbitration tribunals have jurisdiction over such
disputes between enterprises of the same regional economic council or
ministry. 19
The Tribunal's decisions are made both in accordance with the law
and the economic plan,2 20 which are in turn formulated with the intent
215. SovIET LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 26 (presenting an overview of the role
of the third-party umpire).
216. U.S.S.R. CONST., supra note 141, at art. 163; see Decree of May 3, 1931,
Coll. Laws, U.S.S.R. No. 26, art. 203 (1931), cited in Berman, Commercial Contracts
in Soviet Law, 35 CAL. L. REV. 191, 202 (1947) (discussing the decree law which first
established the arbitration tribunals).
217. Soviet economic arbitration boards differ from those in the United States to
the extent that their jurisdiction is mandatory over a class of disputes, rather than
voluntary. Also, the arbitrator is governed strictly by the civil law in his decisions,
having less freedom to impose equitable and creative solutions to resolve the parties'
dispute. They are more comparable in form and function to, though somewhat more
formal than, the United States administrative tribunals. Decree of May 3, 1931, Coll.
Laws, U.S.S.R. No. 26, art. 203 (1931), cited in Berman, Commercial Contracts in
Soviet Law, 35 CAL. L. REV. 191, 202 (1947).
218. See H. BERMAN, supra note 160, at 124 (presenting an overview of the work
of the Arbitration Tribunals).
219. Mozhaiko, 6 '0 pravovoi prirode sovetskogo gosudarstvennogo arbitrasha,'
Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo (1947), cited in G. GUINS, supra note 152, at note 119
(presenting an overview of the work of the Arbitration Tribunals).
220. See H. BERMAN, supra note 157, at 127 (discussing the relationship of the
civil law to the economic plan). The economic plan is drawn by the Soviet State to
insure "the maximum utilization of institutions and resources from the point of view of
economic development." Id. at 101. On the relationship of the civil law and the eco-
nomic plan in the role of Tribunal decisions, Berman notes: "[w]hereas economic expe-
diency was previously hailed as the ultimate criterion for the decision of disputes, it is
now stated as the judicial protection of property."
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of maximizing the interests of the state.22' Although the majority of
disputes are for breach of contract, 222 the Tribunals also have compe-
tence to hear claims related to the parties' inability to resolve disagree-
ments on the terms of performance as well as penalties which arise over
the contractual negotiations 223 The arbitrator is generally a lawyer, or
a layperson assisted by lawyers, 2 4 and has broad powers, similar to
those of a judge. 25 Unlike United States administrative tribunals, but
similar to the Soviet courts, the Soviet arbitration tribunals have an
affirmative obligation to inform the state planning organs of defects in
planning and operation of the economy so as to contribute to a "pre-
ventive law" function.226
2. The Comrades' Courts
Another quasi-judicial organ, the Comrades' Court, is organized to
hear minor criminal and civi 227 offenses and to resolve a wide variety
of minor disputes among citizens.228 Comrades' Courts are established
in nearly all larger community organizations.2 29 The courts are compe-
221. Id. at 101 (discussing the objectives of the economic plan).
222. Id. at 130 (discussing the nature of disputes before the state arbitration
tribunal).
223. Id. at 130-32; see also G. GUINS, supra note 152, at 117-20 (noting that
procurators also may be called upon to help mediate disputes at early stages, to prevent
the necessity of going before a tribunal). In this role, the Procurator provides a func-
tion very similar to that of the U.S. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. Id.
224. H. BERMAN, supra note 161, at 191 (presenting a concise overview of the work
of the arbitration tribunals).
225. Id.
226. See Mozhaiko, 6 '0 pravovoi prirode sovetskogo gosudarstvennogo arbi-
trasha.' Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo (1947), cited in G. Guts, supra note 160, at
119 (discussing the preventive law function of the planning organs).
227. Comrades' Courts exemplify the collectivist mentality found not only in the
Soviet Union, but also in close, primitive communities. See D. BLACK, THE BEMvIoR
OF LAW 105-21 (1976) (discussing the relationship of different forms of social control
to the legal system); see also L. NADER & H. TODD, supra note 2 (presenting a study
of dispute resolution in relatively primitive societies).
Krushchev, in his enthusiasm to promote the role of each citizen in the administra-
tion of justice, considered Comrades' Courts, and other similar bodies, as essential for
the smooth operation of Soviet society. Khrushchev, Pravda, Jan. 29, 1959, cited in K.
HULICKA & I. HULICKA, supra note 160, at 299.
228. See Gorkin, The Tasks Facing Soviet Justice Under Present Conditions,
IZv EsTIA, June 2, 1963, at 5; Mironob, Main Thing Is Prevention and Upbringing
Work, IZVESTIA, June 2, 1963 at 2-4, cited in K. HuUCKA & 1. HULICKA, supra note
160, at 300 (noting that during the early 1960's, there were more than two-hundred
thousand Comrades' Courts hearing up to four million cases annually); see also Los,
supra note 185, at 456-57 (presenting a concise history of the Comrades' Courts).
229. See G. SMITH, PUBUC POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE SOVIET UNION
135 (1980) (stating that Comrades' Courts are located at "enterprises, institutions.
organizations, higher and specialized secondary schools, collective farms, apartment
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tent to hear not only violations of specific laws, but more importantly,
disputes regarding the general behavior of community members. 30
Comrades' Court judges may impose a wide variety of remedies. 231
The penalties provided for in the statute relate largely to social embar-
rassment and publicity.232 These rulings are not subject to review in the
Peoples' Courts. 233 Because community morals, rather than codified
law,2u form the basis of Comrades' Court decisions, Comrades' Courts
organize and institutionalize social control through social coercion. 235
buildings, and rural collectives of at least fifty people").
230. See Khrushchev, Problems of Theory: Report to the XXI Extraordinary Con-
gress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Pravda, Jan. 28, 1959, cited in
SovIET LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 17 (discussing the relationship of the work of
the Comrades' Courts to the enforcement of social norms); see also Statute on Com-
rades' Courts, July 3, 1961 (amended Mar. 3, 1962, Oct. 23, 1963 and Jan. 16, 1965),
reprinted in Polozhenie 0 Tovarishchikh Sudakh (1967), cited in SOVIET LEGAL SYS-
TEM, supra note 7, at 19. The Statute on Comrades' Courts provides:
Comrades' courts are elected public organs charged with actively contributing
to the rearing of citizens in the spirit of a communist attitude toward work, to-
ward socialist prosperity, toward preservation of the rules of socialist society, to-
ward the development in soviet people of a sense of collectivism and comradely
mutual assistance, toward respect for the dignity and honor of citizens. Of pri-
mary importance in the work of Comrades' courts is the prevention of violation
of law and of misdemeanors, detrimental to society, rearing of people through
conviction and social influence, creating conditions of intolerance to any antiso-
cial acts. Comrades' courts are invested with the trust of the collective, express
its will and are responsible to it.
Id. (emphasis added). Offenses within the jurisdiction of the Comrades' Courts include:
"appearance in an intoxicated condition or other unworthy conduct in public place or
at work;. . . unworthy behavior toward women, failure to perform duties related to the
rearing of children, unworthy behavior toward parents; abusive language, ... the
damaging of trees and other greenery"). Id.
231. See SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 15 (discussing the work of the
Comrades' Courts generally); Statute on Comrades' Courts, July 3, 1961 (amended
Mar. 3, 1962, Oct. 23, 1963 and Jan. 16, 1965), reprinted in POLOZHENIE 0 TOVAR-
ISHCHIKH SUDAKH (1967), cited in SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 19. For
example, Statute of the Comrades' Courts, article 15 notes that "A comrades' court
may apply to the accused the following measures of influence: 1) require the offender
to apologize publicly to the victim or the collective; 2) announce a comradely warning;
3) announce a public censure; 4) announce a public reprimand with or without publica-
tion in the press; . . . and may impose fines." Id.
232. Id.
233. See SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 23 (discussing the Comrades'
Courts and the doctrine of judicial review).
234. Interview with former Soviet citizen, supra note 163. See Model Act of Com-
radely Courts, in 2 IzvESTIA, Oct. 24, 1959, cited in K. HULICKA & I. HULICKA,
supra note 160, at 299 ("Comradely courts are clad in the confidence of the collective
and express its will . . .[their] duties include educating Soviet citizens in the spirit of
communist attitude toward work, socialist prosperity, observance of the rules of social-
ist co-existence, promoting within the Soviet people the spirit of collectivism, comradely
help, respect for the dignity and honor of the citizens").
235. See Tovarishcheskie sudy kolliktivnyi pedagog, IzVESTIA, Oct. 21, 1959, at 2,
cited in G. SMITH, supra note 229, at 135 (quoting a woman's expression of the humili-
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Social organizations prosecute members of their own community to en-
force norms of proper social behavior.236 Attorneys, as a general rule,
do not participate.2 3 1 Other members of the community, family, and
friends may provide support for the complainant or defendant. 238
The Comrades' Courts exemplify a phenomena that is unique to the
Soviet Union and other single-party states, as well as in close, primitive
communities. 39 Social pressures act not only to promote early resolu-
tion of disputes, but also to prevent disputes entirely. 240
E. THE NON-JUDICIAL FORUM
In addition to judicial and quasi-judicial forums for dispute resolu-
tion, other forms of informal, non-judicial dispute resolution exist
through various social organizations. 241 In the Soviet Union, as in most
societies, where one citizen has a dispute with another, perhaps over
use of space in an apartment building, or treatment of children in a
playground, the comiilainant can freely confront the individual. If the
respondent party is not disposed to dealing directly with the complain-
ant, however, and the degree of conflict in the dispute escalates because
of lack of successful negotiation, the complainant has the option of
seeking counsel from Party Committee leaders of social organizations
to which the respondent belongs, 4 2 or from supervisors at the respon-
ation she felt when appearing before a Comrades' Court: "l am ashamed to appear
before the comrades with whom I work . . . [rJeally, it is easier to endure a stricter
punishment than the stern court of the collective.").
236. See G. SMITH, supra note 229, at 135 (social organizations prosecute mem-
bers of their own community "to uncover the violator [of social order], not only when
he has committed a misdeed or offense, but also when he demonstrates variation in
acceptable norms of behavior which may lead to anti-social deeds. People can, by
timely measures influence them, suppress their bad inclinations").
237. Interviews with former Soviet citizen, supra note 163. Interview with Louise I.
Shelley, Professor of Soviet Law, Washington College of Law, The American Univer-
sity, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 18, 1985).
238. Interview with Louise I. Shelley, Professor of Soviet Law, Washington College
of Law, The American University, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 18, 1985).
239. See D. BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW 105-121 (1976) (discussing the rela-
tionship of different forms of social control to the legal system); L. NADER & H. TODD,
supra note 2 (presenting a study of dispute resolution in relatively primitive cultures).
240. Interview with former Soviet citizen, supra note 163.
241. Id.
242. Rules of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. as adopted by the
Twenty-Second Communist Party Congress (Oct. 31, 1961), reprinted in IZVESTIA,
Nov. 3, 1961, cited in SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 10 ("At congresses,
conferences, and meetings called by soviet, labor union, cooperative and other mass
organizations where there are not less than three Party members, Party groups shall be
formed. The task of these groups is to strengthen the influence of the Party in every
way and to carry out its policy among the non-party people, to strengthen Party and
state discipline, to combat bureaucracy, and to verify fulfillment of Party and Soviet
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dent's place of employment, to coerce the respondent to make efforts to
resolve a dispute.2 43 Every citizen has the authority, if not the duty, to
keep a watchful eye on the activities of the other 244 and public opinion
is a powerful influence on social behavior.2 5 The existence of these
other informal, yet powerful, socially coercive mechanisms provide an-
other distinction between the civil dispute resolution mechanisms of the
United States and the Soviet Union.
F. SUMMARY OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM
Part II of this study has surveyed the Soviet civil justice system with
a focus on access to civil justice. The Soviet system guarantees citizen
access to civil justice implicitly through constitutional guarantees, and
explicitly through legislative guarantees. The judicial system remains
the center for civil dispute resolution. In contrast to the United States
judicial forum, however, high costs, delays, and inappropriateness of
the forum do not bar access to Soviet justice. Court costs are minimal.
Attorneys' fees are low. Self-representation in court is common. Where
legal counsel is necessary, parties can obtain it free of charge or at low
cost in community bar offices or in the workplace. Legislative require-
ments for the processing of claims and flexible court mechanisms,
moreover, provide for expeditious treatment of complaints.
In addition, numerous quasi-judicial and non-judicial civil dispute
resolution alternatives complement the efficiency of the judiciary. The
administrative tribunals handle a large body of economic disputes
through adjudication. The Comrades' Courts are an integral part of
community organizations and exemplify the socialist character of much
of the quasi-judicial and non-judicial civil dispute resolution in the So-
viet Union. Community members adjudicate the claims of their peers
in a flexible informal setting and impose judgments and punishments in
accordance with social values.
Informal non-judicial civil dispute resolution mechanisms using so-
cial pressure to resolve disputes supplement the Comrades' Courts. Cit-
izens' ability to solicit advice from employers and Party committees
and support from otherwise neutral third-parties on an entirely infor-
mal basis functions to both solve and prevent civil disputes.
directives").





III. A COMPARATIVE SUMMARY
Both the United States and the Soviet Union have many complex
and specialized mechanisms for civil dispute resolution. Both civil jus-
tice systems primarily rely upon a government-administered court sys-
tem. Other quasi-judicial and non-judicial structures exist which pro-
vide additional compulsory and consensual forums for civil dispute
resolution. Despite these general similarities, however, United States
citizens have far less access to the civil justice system than their Soviet
counterparts. The United States system remains inefficient and now
faces a period of great experimentation and evolution in an effort to
remedy these concerns. On the other hand, the Soviet civil justice sys-
tem already provides quality civil justice.40 What then might be
learned from the Soviet system?
The Soviet system's success stems primarily from the philosophical
relationship of law to justice in that society.247 Civil justice is accessible
to the Soviet citizen because of the "democratization" of the law.24 8
The United States elevates its civil justice system above the layperson.
Individuals who have studied the law oversee an overrated court system
which, despite its high price for the common individual, has maintained
a monopoly over professional civil dispute resolution and has become an
overly influential participant in the society. 20 Only in recent decades
has citizens' faith in the traditional court system faced popular chal-
246. It is important to note, however, that an analysis of the Soviet civil justice
system and its relationship with other institutions in the social fabric suggest that the
Soviet civil justice system creates less than the ideal picture presented by this study. As
indicated in the introduction of this study, one factor in assessing the total "quality" of
civil justice is citizen satisfaction with the resolution of disputes. Other extra-legal real-
ities of the Soviet society diminish the actual virtue of Soviet justice. For example,
although a citizen might be able to obtain a quick, inexpensive divorce, spouses might
not be able to acquire separate housing. See J. BATER, THlE SOVIET CITY 97-111
(1980); THE CONTEMPORARY SOVIET CITY (H. Morton & R. Stuart eds. 1984) (dis-
cussing generally the problems of allocation of housing in the Soviet city with a histori-
cal overview). Although workers may have at their disposal numerous vehicles for the
resolution of disputes in the workplace, they may be inhibited to pursue claims, partic-
ularly against their employer or supervisor, for fear of injuring their long-term relation-
ship with their employer. Interview with Louise I. Shelley, Professor of Soviet Law,
Washington College of Law, The American University, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 18,
1985). The limited availability of research tools on the Soviet legal system makes many
considerations of the effect of extra-legal influences on the quality of legal results spec-
ulative, and many conclusions on the performance of the civil justice system somewhat
qualified. Id.
247. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text (discussing the interrelation-
ship of law, justice, and the courts in the Soviet civil justice system).
248. See supra notes 158-71 and accompanying text (discussing the factors which
contribute to the "democratization" of law in the Soviet society).
249. See J. AUERBACH, supra note 30 (providing a social history of the professional
elite).
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lenge stemming from the professionalization of law and an exaltation of
the ideal of "the law." This illusion of the superiority of a court-pre-
served, lawyer-advocated 'just' justice has helped to prevent effective
reform in the United States.25 0 Despite these criticisms, many com-
plainants, considering the courts the only recourse for the protection of
their legal rights, will wait for up to five years for the privilege of hav-
ing their claims heard before a judge.251
The increased need in the twentieth century for the individual citizen
to resort to the courts for the effective enforcement of individual rights
is largely created by the disintegration of other mechanisms of dispute
resolution and general social control in the society.252 The lack of other
social forces that contribute to a private resolution of civil disputes
where they often arise, in the home and in the community, leaves no
other vehicle for justice other than the courts.253
In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, the civil law does not re-
present the ideals of a higher doctrine, rather it is flexible to fulfill the
needs of the State and of the individual citizen.2 54 Soviet civil law rests
in the hands of all of the people. The civil justice system is adminis-
tered by professionals but the entire system is not professionalized out
250. These criticisms of the U.S. civil justice system have been virtually unchal-
lenged. See Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-Need for Systematic Anticipation, in Na-
tional Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 70 F.R.D. 79, 92 (1976) (commenting that delays and high costs have long
affected the United States system). The delays and high costs in resolving disputes
continue to frighten away potential litigants, and those who persist and ultimately gain
a verdict often see up to half of the recovery absorbed by fees and expenses. "There is
nothing incompatible between efficiency and justice. Inefficient courts cause delay and
expense, and diminish the value of the judgement. . . . Inefficiency drains the value of
even a just result either by delay or excessive cost, or both." See also R. SMITH, supra
note 57 (presenting an early (1919) comprehensive study of the disparity between the
justice offered through law to the rich and that offered to the poor).
251. See Higginbotham, The Priority of Human Rights in Court Reform, in Na-
tional Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 70 F.R.D. 79, 153 (1976) (discussing generally the length of delays in the civil
action).
252. See D. BLACK, supra note 227, at 105-121 (discussing the relationship of dif-
ferent forms of social control to the legal system).
253. See id. at 105-121 (discussing the relationship of different forms of social con-
trol to the legal system); see also DIsPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 6, at 20 (1984)
("The decreasing importance of the family, church and the political process as dispute
resolution forums adds pressure upon the formal judicial dispute resolution system.
Courts are increasingly perceived as the first line of redress for many grievances, rather
than as a forum of last resort").
254. See L. SHELLEY, supra note 170, at 149 ("The force of law rests not on a
written code but on the ability of individuals to personalize authority. An old Russian
saying, 'It is not what you say but how you say it to me,' summarizes this approach to




of the reach of the layperson. Attorneys are regulated to provide af-
fordable and convenient services to the community. Expeditious
processing of claims is guaranteed. Most importantly, the society as a
whole, not just the professionalized bar, accepts responsibility for the
prevention and resolution of civil disputes.25  The participation of the
general society in the administration of civil justice is best exemplified
by the Comrades' Courts which have no counterpart in the United
States. For almost all social organizations, legislation provides for the
creation of a mechanism to enforce the civil and criminal law in the
name of the individual citizens' right and duty to use coercive social
control devices such as economic penalty and public humiliation to in-
fluence fellow citizens. Such a means of civil dispute resolution as the
Comrades' Courts, however, might not be desirable in the United
States given the value placed on individuality in United States
society.256
Although it might be both difficult and undesirable to replicate the
Soviet's system of social control, other aspects of the Soviet system de-
serve admiration. The Soviet system excels in providing inexpensive
and accessible legal counsel. Lawyers use the courts as one of many
potential alternatives for the resolution of disputes and often encourage
citizens to settle their own problems.257 As a result, the civil dispute
resolution mechanisms in the Soviet Union represent a human social
service rather than a highly professionalized business. In societies in
which the professionalization of law has decreased and dispute resolu-
tion is brought closer to the layperson, access to justice is increased.
Given the litigious nature of the American society, a remedy pre-
scribing less-expensive legal services and streamlined adjudication, even
255. See SoviET LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 49 (stating that an objective of
the Russian Revolution was that "[t]he instruments of public order in Soviet society
were to be restored to a simplicity mindful of tribunals in tribal society, and when
conditions of abundance and wide-spread education in social duties had created the
prerequisites for communism, even these primitive tribunals were to wither away. In
their stead would rise the citizen's inner voice of social conscience, prompted when
necessary by a reminder from neighbors and friends who sensed that guidance was
needed to develop attitudes appropriate to the communist society") (emphasis added).
256. Telephone interview with William Martin, Assistant Director of Legal Opera-
tions, Neighborhood Legal Services Program of Washington, D.C. (Feb. 6, 1985). Mr.
Martin stated that American courts are beginning to resort to general social humilia-
tion and coercion to force criminal offenders to conform to social norms. Id. For eam-
ple, he noted that he was aware of one jurisdiction in which offenders of drunk driving
laws, among other penalties, are sentenced to affixing a bumper sticker on their car
announcing to the public their offense. Id.
257. See L. NADER & H. TODD, supra note 2, at 2 (1978) (discussing the relation-
ship of layperson involvement in the civil justice system to increased access to justice).
The professionalization of law separates legal systems from the lower social classes.
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if practicable, might only exacerbate existing problems. Instead, Amer-
icans must change fundamental social attitudes toward the law in order
to reform the system. Reinforcement of citizens' reliance on new dis-
pute resolution forums and consensual dispute resolution, such as medi-
ation, may remove a burden from the courts and may increase citizen
access to and satisfaction with justice.
There is a belief that the professionalized bar and the courts will
eventually lose their monopoly over civil dispute resolution not only be-
cause of their inability to keep up with the demands of the consumers
of the system, but also because the attitudes of those consumers are
changing: citizens are no longer willing to play the justice game accord-
ing to the rules of the established system and are beginning to look for
means to take the law into their own hands. The Multi-Door Program
Intake Center retains many of the virtues of the community legal clin-
ics in the Soviet Union. Although the Center does not offer the assis-
tance of lawyers, specialists screen complaints hoping to channel them
into different dispute resolution forums. This screening encourages the
de-professionalization, popularization and humanization of the law the
American system of civil justice sorely needs.
CONCLUSION
Numerous similarities between the civil justice systems of the United
States and the Soviet Union exist. Both have government-operated
court systems founded on constitutional guarantees and legislation.
Both also have quasi-judicial and non-judicial civil dispute resolution
mechanisms that provide a variety of general and specialized dispute
resolution support.
Nevertheless, these two systems function very differently. Whereas
American citizens are denied access to civil justice through the courts
because of high costs, delays and the inappropriateness of the adver-
sarial model for the resolution of many disputes, their Soviet counter-
parts are provided with ready access to an inexpensive, efficient system.
The principal reason for this difference is the professionalization of the
law in the United States versus the democratization of the law in the
Soviet Union.
The philosophical distinction in the accessibility of the law to the
citizens of the two systems is reflected in the accessibility of the civil
dispute resolution mechanisms. The American system is inaccessible to
the common layperson because of the high level of the professionaliza-
tion of dispute resolution forums and the dependency upon determina-
tion of a 'just' legal ruling. The court systems have, until recent years,
[VOL. 1:215
SOVIET CIVIL JUSTICE
maintained a near monopoly of civil dispute resolution and they are
designed to operate with expensive, well-educated professionals who
have mastered complex rules and procedures. In the Soviet Union,
there are a greater number of well-developed quasi-judicial and non-
judicial dispute resolution mechanisms which function with little input
from the professionalized bar and which resolve millions of civil dis-
putes each year on an informal basis. These quasi-judicial and non-
judicial dispute resolution mechanisms in the Soviet Union draw their
authority not from the law, but rather from the norms of behavior of
the social order. The Comrades' Courts exemplify a relatively less-for-
mal, quasi-judicial forum in the Soviet Union that is well-utilized and
which resolves civil disputes primarily in accordance with social norms.
The principal virtue of the Soviet system which might be transferred
to the American system is that the Soviet civil justice system has a
democratic flavor. Although the Soviet Union does have a professional-
ized bar and a court system that entertains complex suits with complex
procedures, it is still designed for use by the layperson. Legal counsel,
if necessary, is available with little or no cost. The general feeling is
that justice is in the hands of the social organizations and in the people
rather than in the hands of a government figure, judge or 'law-giver.'
The alternative dispute resolution movement in the United States will
continue to grow if citizens challenge the courts' assumed superiority as
a dispute resolution forum and create community dispute resolution fo-
rums which will provide accessible, consensual, and "democratic" civil
justice to all.
John Samuel Scott
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